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by Philip C. Stenning Philip C. Stenning(1) Centre of Criminology University of Toronto Toronto, Ontario "I sat next to her and she said to me early in the afternoon, "What is the answer?" I was silent. In that case," she said, "What is the question?" -- Alice B. Toklas, writing about Gertrude Stein's last moments in What Is Remembered (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), at p. 173. Commenting on a set of legislative proposals without knowing precisely what the problem is to which they are supposed to be an intelligent and reasonable response may not be as hard as trying to figure out the meaning of life in one's last hours, but it certainly is not the ideal situation in which to find oneself as a "critic". Yet the federal government's published output on its current proposals for new gun control legislation (Canada, Department of Justice 1994a, b, c) leave us pretty much in this position. The main document outlining the proposals (The Government's Action Plan on Firearms Control -- henceforth "the Action Plan document") is strangely silent about the nature and dimensions of the "problem(s)" which require(s) such "action". The background document which accompanied it (Background Information on Firearms Control) is scarcely more informative in this regard, intoning as it does that "Tough action is necessary to address violence in our society, and to prevent crime in our communities" (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 1). Exactly how the proposed "action plan" will address violence and prevent crime -- and what kinds and levels of reductions in firearms abuses in particular might be expected from its implementation, and over what period of time, and at what cost -- are the subject of no serious discussion in either document, and are not self-evident from the proposals themselves. Such inattention to the details of the growing problems to be solved is perhaps not surprising in light of the available evidence, virtually all of which suggests that problems of firearms abuse have not significantly increased in recent years. A report prepared for the Department of Justice and submitted in July 1994 (i.e., five months before the "Action Plan" document was released), summarized the evidence in this regard in the following way Another widespread belief is that the incidence of crimes involving firearms has increased recently. There are no statistical data to support this view. For example, the percentage of robberies committed with the assistance of a firearm has remained at one-quarter over the past four years.... The rate of robberies committed with a firearm has actually decreased from 36 per 100,000 in 1982 to 32 per 100,000 in 1992 (Roberts 1994:19). As Roberts points out, it is not just official police statistics which point in this direction. The most recent General Social Survey results also indicated that the use of weapons decreased over the preceding five years (Gartner and Doob 1994). Evidence concerning non-criminal forms of firearms abuses is all in the same vein; both the proportion of suicides committed with firearms and the actual numbers of them have decreased over the last several years, despite increases in the population and in the number of firearms in household ownership, and accidental deaths involving firearms have steadily declined over the last few years (Stenning 1994). With this evidence at hand, the conclusion that the current clamour for tougher gun control laws is the product of a "moral panic", engendered by sensational media reporting of isolated firearms incidents such as the "Just Desserts" killing in Toronto and a drive-by homicide in Ottawa, is hard to resist. That neither of these tragic events involved the use of handguns, but both generated immediate and vocal calls for increased controls over handguns, is indicative of the confusion and misconceptions which so easily dominate public and political debate following such sensational media coverage of relatively unusual events. That politicians exploit such situations for partisan advantage is regrettable, but hardly surprising. In the case of the present government, its public commitment (in the famous "Red Book" to "strengthen our gun control laws" (Liberal Party of Canada 1993: 85) is clearly the driving force behind its current "Action Plan" in this area, rather than any credible evidence of growing problems of firearms abuse in recent years. The result is a set of legislative proposals which contains no clear indications of the problems which the recommended measures are supposed to be addressing. The presentation of the most controversial of the proposals -- the plan to register all gun owners and then all guns in private ownership -- is typical in this regard. In a section entitled "The advantages of universal registration", the "Action Plan" document (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 14-15) states that: Registration will bring a greater degree of overall firearms control. and with it a number of direct benefits: * deter and control theft, diversion and smuggling of firearms; * ensure individual and business compliance with transfer and safe storage requirements * assistance in police investigations * enable police in domestic violence situations to better prepare themselves where they know a firearm is present in the home: * enable police to enforce court prohibition orders by ensuring that all firearms owned by the individuals have been turned in; * license access to information (further deterring illegal acquisition and smuggling); * monitor firearm traffic through Canada, assisting international small arms controls; and * gather accurate statistical information about firearm numbers and ownership patterns. If one knew the expected costs of implementing the plan for universal registration -- about which the government has been mostly silent, but occasionally quite misleading (of which more below) -- one could perhaps make some judgment about whether some or all these rather modest "direct benefits" (a) would justify the costs, if actually realized, or (b) might be realizable in some other way(s) at lesser cost. Much more important than such calculations, however, is to ask whether (and if so how) universal registration will actually result in any reductions in any of the major forms of firearms abuses which are understandably the source of so much concern, such as homicidal, suicidal and accidental deaths from firearms, and use of firearms in crimes such as robbery, drug trafficking, assaults, kidnappings, terrorism, etc. Yet beyond the questionable claim that universal registration will "deter and control theft, diversion and smuggling of firearms" (sixty years of universal handgun registration in Canada certainly does not provide much basis for optimism in this regard), the government remains largely silent about such important matters. Rather, we are left to assume that the other "direct benefits" which we are told can be expected from universal registration of firearms will themselves lead to reductions in actual firearms abuses. Yet however plausible such propositions may sound (e.g., that universal registration will lead to safer storage of firearms, which in turn will lead to reductions in thefts of firearms, accidental firearms deaths, suicides and domestic homicides with firearms, and use of firearms in other crimes), their inherent plausibility is no guarantee of their validity. Nor should it be accepted as a substitute for some persuasive evidence of it, especially when such costly measures as universal registration are under consideration, and when, with a little effort, relevant evidence on such matters can be obtained. My point here -- which is a simple but important one -- is that, especially in times of fiscal restraint such as the present, we are entitled to expect that the proponents of potentially expensive legislative programs gather and provide credible and relatively easily available evidence of the likely benefits to be derived from such programs, rather than relying on implicit and unsupported suppositions (however plausible they may sound) about such benefits. Thus, I am not arguing, for instance, that universal registration of firearms (or any of the other measures being proposed, for that matter) will or will not result in significant reductions in firearms abuses, although the available evidence in Canada does not seem to me to be very encouraging in this regard. Rather, I am arguing that the government has in this instance failed in its public responsibility to provide whatever credible evidence might be garnered to support its proposals. The government's failure in this regard is all the more regrettable in light of the fact that the federal Department of Justice and the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics have, in recent years, been making significant efforts to undertake and commission serious and credible research into problems of firearms abuse and their relationship to firearms availability and to gun control measures. It is not, therefore, that relevant information is not available -- although there is certainly not enough of it yet -- so much as that it does not appear to be considered relevant or important by the politicians and bureaucrats who seek to promote publicly popular legislative policies in this area. Such a posture is the hallmark of government which is responsive but not responsible. The government's proposals with respect to Section 85 of the Criminal Code are illustrative in this regard. This section of the Code provides for a separate offence of using a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence or during flight thereafter. Upon conviction for this offence, the offender is liable to be sentenced to a minimum one-year term of imprisonment which will be in addition to, and run consecutively to, any sentence which may be imposed for the main offence (most typically robbery) in the commission of which the firearm was used. A second or subsequent conviction for an offence under Section 85 carries a minimum three-year term of imprisonment. Section 85 was introduced into the Criminal Code as part of the 1976/77 gun control reform package, and until very recently its implementation, effectiveness, and impact have not been the subject of any serious or systematic inquiry. In 1994, however, the Department of Justice commissioned research to examine available data on these matters, and gather additional information about them. Despite the fact that the report of the findings of this research (Meredith, Steinke, Palmer 1994) is dated "December 1994", it is clear that they were known to the Department before it published its "Action Plan" document in November 1994, because the main findings of the research are referred to on pp. 6-7 of this latter document. The principal findings of the Meredith et al. study of Section 85 were not very encouraging. The researchers discovered that problems associated with the implementation of Section 85 were not very different from those identified with similar provisions upon which research has been carried out in the United States. Principal among these is the finding that the section typically does not operate as intended either because charges under the section are plea-bargained away or because judges, in setting sentences for the Section 85 offence and the main offence, frequently discount the sentence for the main offence in light of the mandatory minimum sentence for the Section 85 offence. The result is that in total the sentence imposed is not significantly different from the sentence which would have been imposed had the accused simply been charged with the main offence and not also with the Section 85 offence. As Meredith et al. (1994: 46) expressed it in the conclusions to their report: The general view among the key informants interviewed for this report is that [the single year of imprisonment to which most people convicted under Section 85 are sentenced] is not truly incremental to the sentence which would have been imposed for the substantive offence alone. The research in the literature concurs with this perspective. While judges may add some amount of incremental prison time pursuant to a conviction under Section 85, the overriding principle is that of totality. Meredith et al. also found that the mandatory three-year sentence provided for a second or subsequent conviction under Section 85 was used in "very few cases", and that some of the key informants" inter-viewed during the study (police, crown prosecutors, and criminal court judges) were not even aware of the existence of this provision in Section 85. They also found that the numbers of charges laid under Section 85 in recent years has remained "fairly steady" despite the fact that some of the key informants they interviewed perceived that the use of firearms in criminal offences has been increasing (Meredith et al. 1994: 45). They noted the findings of research on similar provisions elsewhere that "as a means of incapacitation, mandatory minimum penalties are estimated to have no more than a modest impact on crime rates for the target offence", that "mandatory minimum penalties are associated with lower overall probabilities of conviction for the target offence", that "juries may be less willing to convict if they know that the charge being tried is covered by a mandatory minimum penalty", that "mandatory penalties may increase trial rates", and that "implementation of mandatory minimum penalties can increase prison populations" (Meredith et al. 1994: 16). As if all this information were not discouraging enough about the likely cost-effectiveness of mandatory minimum penalties as a strategy to reduce firearms abuses, Meredith et al. (1994: 45-46) also noted that "a consistent half to two thirds of Section 85 charges are withdrawn, stayed or dismissed" when they reach court, and that apart, from robbery cases (which account for at least half of the Section 85 charges which are laid), Section 85 charges are rarely laid in other cases involving offences against the person (which are presumably the most serious cases in which one would expect Section 85 to be invoked if it is to have any deterrent effect). Finally, Meredith et al. report that despite all these difficulties of implementation and effectiveness, most of their key informants felt that Section 85 should be broadened to include the use of replica guns, toy guns, and air guns in the commission of crimes. The government's response to this research intelligence concerning the efficacy of Section 85 as a strategy to curb firearms abuses appears to be in the "if it doesn't work, let's do more of it" vein -- admittedly an all too common reaction among criminal policy makers. Its "Action Plan" document proposes no significant change to Section 85 other than to include the use of imitation firearms within its scope, and increase the mandatory minimum penalty on conviction for a first offence under the section to four years' imprisonment and lifetime prohibition from possessing a restricted weapon, if the main offence during the course of which a firearm was used was one of ten designated offences against the person. With reference to all the problems associated with the implementation and effectiveness of Section 85 revealed by the research, the "Action Plan" document simply adds glibly that "in addition to these changes in the law, more will be done to encourage police, prosecutors and the courts to use these provisions effectively" (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 7). The fact that no-one else in the world has apparently figured out yet how to achieve this is evidently not considered worthy of mention, let alone discussion. The all-important impression that the government is taking "tough action... to address violence in society" seems to be all that matters here. The government's determination to promote its legislative package regardless of any evidence of its likely effectiveness in reducing the incidence of firearms abuses is matched only by its determination to gloss over the likely costs of implementing these proposals. In this regard, some quite misleading figures have been bandied about in recent months, but there has been no evidence of any willingness to provide a full and candid accounting. Beyond the vague statement that fees for registration of guns and gun owners "will be adjusted as necessary to achieve cost-recovery" (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 13; see also Canada, Department of Justice 1994a: 19), the two main documents describing the government's proposals contain no discussion at all of their likely costs. Discussion of the proposals in the media has tended to proceed on the assumption that the proposed universal registration of firearms and firearms owners is the only big-ticket item in the proposals. This is almost certainly not the case, however, especially when indirect as well as direct costs are considered. To mention only a few, there will clearly be substantial costs incurred for advertising and public education about the new laws during the proposed eight-year period of their implementation (Canada, Department of Justice 1994a: 23); owners of over 14,000 handguns, assault rifles and combat shotguns which have been prohibited as of January 1st, 1995 are to be compensated for the confiscation of these weapons (Canada, Department of Justice 1994a: 11: and Canada, Department of Justice 1994c); costs will be incurred for the proposed inspections of all of the undisclosed number of bona fide gun collections, each of which is to be inspected "at least once every five years" (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 3); unknown costs will be incurred for additional police, prosecutorial, court, and correctional resources required to enforce the proposed new offences and penalties (especially mandatory minimum sentences) and enhanced use of prohibition orders, and for customs and excise personnel and equipment to implement the enhanced border controls which are proposed; the new (additional) training requirements for owners of restricted firearms (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 3-4) will obviously involve additional costs, as will the development and administration of new national standards for government approval of shooting clubs and firearms safety courses (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 4 and 17-18), and for the mandatory tracking of all police and military firearms. And the list goes on. Talk of "cost-recovery", of which there has been quite a bit in recent weeks, is very misleading with respect to most of these costs, since in many cases the actual costs have not been disclosed and are probably not yet (and may never be) known. Even with respect to the proposed registration system, however, the basis on which expected costs have been calculated is highly questionable. The government's "Backgrounder" on the proposed new national firearms registration system refers to the fact that 'there are an estimated 7 million firearms in Canada" (Canada, Department of Justice 1994a: 20), and this is clearly the figure on which estimates of the costs of the registration system have been based (see e.g., Globe and Mail 1994: Al 1). The figure of 7 million, however, refers to the estimated number of guns in household ownership in Canada (Angus Reid Group Inc. 1991), not to the total number of firearms in the country. Research in the 1970's suggested that guns in household ownership represent only about half of the total gun stock in the country (Stenning and Moyer 198 1) -- the remainder being in armouries, gun shops, gun clubs, museums, private collections, etc. -- and there is no reason to think that this ratio has significantly changed in recent years. To have any chance of being effective, a national registry of firearms must include all guns in the country, not simply those which are in household ownership at any particular time, and it is clear from the government's proposals that this is the intention (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 11), except that police and military firearms are to be tracked through separate systems operated by the R.C.M.P. and the Department of National Defence respectively (Canada, Department of Justice 1994b: 17-18). We may expect, therefore, that the actual costs of implementing the universal registration proposal will greatly exceed the estimates so far made public by the government. Without adequate information about what the government's proposals will cost, of course, there can be no discussion of alternative ways in which such funds might be deployed to address problems of firearms abuse, or of which other important programs (such as the federal government's domestic violence initiatives) will be cut back or eliminated in order to free up funding for the new gun control measures. Yet such discussions should be an integral part of any serious debate about the government's proposals. When this inattention to the expected costs of the proposals is added to the inattention to their likely effectiveness in actually achieving reductions in the incidence of various forms of firearms abuse, and the complete absence in the government's proposals of any reference to any plan to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures during or after their implementation (or of the costs of doing so), we are left without any realistic basis for assessing the merits of the proposals. This may be good political and legislative strategy, but it can hardly be described as responsible government. It is to be hoped that during the parliamentary process, some of the important questions will be raised, and that some satisfactory answers will be insisted upon. Note (1.) Philip Stenning is an Associate Professor at the Center of Criminology, University of Toronto, who undertakes independent research on firearms abuse and gun control issues. He does not own or use guns. and does not belong to, speak for, or undertake research on behalf of, any group representing those who own or use firearms. References Angus Reid Group. Inc. 1991 Firearms Ownership in Canada. A report prepared for the Department of Justice Canada. Ottawa. Canada, Department of Justice 1994a Background Information on Firearms Control. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. Canada, Department of Justice 1994b The Government's Action Plan on Firearms Control. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works Government Services Canada. Canada, Department of Justice 1994c Weapons Prohibited By Order In Council. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. Gartner, R. and A. Doob 1994 Trends in criminal victimization: 1988-1993. Juristat Service Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 13. Globe and Mail (Tu Thanh Ha) 1994 Gun plan `final', Rock declares. 1 December, 1994: Al and A11. Liberal Party of Canada 1993 Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada. Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada. Meredith, C., B. Steinke and S. Palmer 1994 Research on the Application of Section 85 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. Roberts, J. 1994 Public Knowledge of Crime and Justice: An Inventory of Canadian Findings. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada. Stenning, P. 1994 Gun control: A critique of current policy. Policy Options 15(8): 13-17. Stenning, P. and S. Moyer 1981 Firearms Ownership and Use in Canada: A Report of Survey Findings, 1976. Toronto: Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.
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