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BANNING LANDMINES IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY.

by Richard A. Matthew , Ken R. Rutherford

Richard A. Matthew

Ken R. Rutherford

School of Social Ecology

University of California

Irvine, California 92697-7075

USA

Co-Founder, Landmine Survivors Network

700 Thirteenth Street, #950

Washington, DC 20005

USA

Richard A. Matthew is Assistant Professor in the School of Social Ecology at the University of California at Irvine, Faculty Associate in the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, and Director of the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Research Office. He has published numerous articles on environmental issues, ethics in international affairs and international organization. Recent works indude Contested Ground: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics.

Ken R. Rutherford is Co-Founder of the Landmine Survivors Network, the first organization for landmine survivors by landmine survivors. He is currently a university fellow and doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

In the early 1990s, the United States assumed international leadership to recast landmines as a humanitarian issue, and ultimately eliminate their use. By mid-decade, however, with discussion at a critical threshold, the US began to retreat. The Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and entered force in 1999 without the US. While this may discourage those who feel US support is integral to the success of multilateral efforts, it opens opportunities for middle powers and non-state actors to shape emerging issues. The landmine case reveals the character of international affairs and the uncertain role of the US; it may also contribute to the debate between military necessity and humanitarian law.

Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war....

Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. ... in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863

Introduction

Signed by more than one-hundred-forty states, the Mine Ban Treaty [1] entered into force on March 1, 1999. Conspicuously absent from the signatories to this treaty, negotiated outside the UN system, is the United States, once a leader in the international effort to address the humanitarian crisis posed by antipersonnel landmines (APLs). Why did the international effort spiral away from both the United States and the United Nations? What does this case suggest about the character of international relations at the close of the twentieth century--the so-called "American Century"? Should the advocates of a universal mine ban be encouraged or discouraged by the recent course of events?

In Henry Luce's famous Life magazine essay, "The American Century," he sketched the still popular image of an America inspired by a spirit of internationalism, using its immense power for the betterment of humankind. [2] We argue that, in fact, the US is all too often wedded to a doctrine of American exceptionalism, through which it justifies distancing itself from multilateral processes, even when these are aimed at the betterment of humankind and guided by principles the US formally--and often loudly--espouses. Moreover, as this case illustrates, the scrappy nature of American domestic politics can compel the US into an exceptionalist stance even when the justification for this is very weak. Buffeted by ill-conceived and particular notions of national interest at home, but nonetheless aware of demands to support multilateral initiatives abroad, US foreign policymakers endlessly seek to fragment, slow down and otherwise lighten the burdens of decisionmaking. While this is discouraging to many, it creates sp ace in the international arena for entrepreneurial middle powers and non-state actors to assume leadership roles in new issue areas, as Norway and Canada and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) have done with regard to the problem of landmines.

Background

At least since Thucydides penned The Peloponnesian War, the debate between military necessity and humanitarian law has been a mainstay of international affairs. In 1863 the United States weighed in on this debate with the Lieber Code, prelude to a series of international agreements that came to define contemporary humanitarian law. [3] The first wave of this law followed two very bloody conflicts--the American Civil War and the Boer War; a second wave was initiated at the end of World War II; and a third wave may be taking shape today in the post Cold War era. Both realists and idealists can find support for their views in this century's complex history of conflict and cooperation, of unspeakable violence and unwavering moral resolve. [4]

While it is difficult to assess the full impact of humanitarian law; and it has certainly been violated in letter and spirit on many occasions, it is hard to imagine that the world would be as good or better without it. Surely enough people have been aided by Red Cross workers on battlefields worldwide to confirm this. But other aspects of humanitarian law are clearly more elusive-how does it fare in safeguarding civilians or limiting the use of especially gruesome weapons, for example? In these regards, anti-personnel landmines may provide an excellent test case. A decline in their use could well be interpreted as a positive indication of the impact of humanitarian law.

In recent decades, trends in landmine use have been alarming enough to place this issue on the global agenda. The first effort to curtail their use-Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) [5] --represented the culmination of discussions initiated in the 1960s and continued in the 1970s on limiting the use of certain conventional weapons. Protocol II was widely disregarded, however, and the problems posed by landmines escalated in this period. In 1993, encouraged by non-governmental organizations working in mine-infested countries, France introduced a LTNGA resolution calling for a review conference of the CCW This resolution was unanimously adopted and two review sessions were held in Vienna (1995) and Geneva (1996). These discussions concentrated on gradually limiting the use of landmines. As evidence mounted and the debate unfolded, however, many countries began to believe that a total ban was both desirable and practical. Because advocates of a total ban were unable to have thi s issue addressed in the context of the review conferences, in 1996 Canada hosted an international strategy conference outside the UN system, entitled "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines." Seventy countries and fifty NGOs met in Ottawa and called for an immediate ban--a call that led to further negotiations in Oslo and ultimately a Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) signing conference in December 1997. Under the aegis of the ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams, the non-governmental organization (NGO) community was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in this effort, and, as noted earlier, the MBT came into force on March 1, 1999. The US is one of a handful of countries that will not sign the MBT, and--somewhat ironically given its frequent criticism of the UN as anti-American and generally ineffective--seeks instead to work through the plodding UN process toward the goal of a universal ban on APLs.

The Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines

There are two basic categories of landmine. Anti-tank mines are powerful explosives designed to destroy tanks and other vehicles. Laid along transport routes (and thus relatively easy to locate), they often kill people as well. Anti-personnel mines tend to be smaller; they are designed to cause severe injury to individuals, although they also frequently cause death. Costing a few dollars each, they can be scattered over any terrain by hand, artillery or aircraft. Sand can cover them and water can move them. "Smart" mines self-destruct or are otherwise disabled after a certain period of time; "dumb" mines can remain active for fifty or even a hundred years.

In over 60 countries, an estimated 110 million landmines are currently active. After hostilities have ceased or the mines otherwise have outlived their original purpose, they are often left behind, because they are extremely expensive to clear (from $100-$1000 each). [6] Demining technology has made little progress since World War II-mines continue to be located and dismantled one at a time using metal detectors, search dogs and other labor-intensive means. A slow and costly process, demining has made little headway--in 1994, for example, about two million new mines were laid; only 100,000 were cleared. [7]

The consequences of this situation are horrifying. Each year some 26,000 people, mostly civilian women and children, are maimed and killed by APLs. Children are especially vulnerable--attracted to the toy-like appearance of many landmines, their fragile bodies are often severely injured, consigning them to lives of extreme misery and suffering. The long-term public health costs are enormous (an estimated $3000 per victim)--and many countries are simply unable to provide adequate care or rehabilitation services. [8] Arable lands and urban neighborhoods often are abandoned by terrified residents. A further toll is exacted from other species; some research suggests that in recent years, hundreds of thousands of animals have been destroyed by landmines. [9] Although the greatest problems are in Egypt (23 million mines), Libya (2-12 million mines), Afghanistan (10 million mines), Cambodia (6-10 million mines), Angola (5-10 million mines), Kuwait (7 million mines), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 million mines), Croatia (3 million mines) and other sites of recent conflict, citizens of all countries are at risk. For example, in World War II, 4.4 percent of American casualties were caused by landmines, while in Vietnam it was 33 percent, in Somalia 26 percent, and in Bosnia 80 percent. [10] A UN database suggests that if a total ban was respected today, it might still take 1100 years and cost $33 billion to demine the planet. [11]

Some security specialists, however, argue that a total ban would be misguided: APLs serve an essential military function. This argument, which influenced the US decision to retreat from the total ban process, deserves careful consideration.

Arguments Against a Total Ban

Senior Defense Official #1: [L]et me talk for a moment about the need and the purpose of...anti-personnel landmines. We can use them in a force projection scenario. These are three illustrative scenarios. Here we have a small American unit on this objective. They are facing an aggressor, a large-sized aggressor, and there are no reinforcements yet. You can place a minefield here between our people and the aggressor to slow down the aggressor.... If you have smaller forces, reduced forces, you can use mines to protect that flank in the absence of another battalion.... You can also use them to shape the battlefield.

U.S. Department of Defense Background Briefing Subject: Landmines/Thursday, May 16, 1996, 2:00p.m.)

According to the Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) the US currently uses APLs in three situations: to protect American troops in Korea and Guantanamo Bay and for training purposes. [12] Official U.S. policy is to limit the use of dumb APLs to Korea and training exercises, and to work toward the elimination of this double edged weapon by 2006-20 10, as long as an alternative can be developed.

There are three military arguments in defense of APLs. First, they are an effective way of protecting troops and conserving forces sited in hostile locations, such as Korea. Second, they help maximize the effectiveness of anti-tank landmines (ATLs), designed to protect advance troops from armored attack until reinforcements arrive. And third, they are essential for training activities, especially in a world awash with this sort of weapon. After all, APLs are easy to manufacture, transport and position, which is why they are being used by violent, transnational groups--such as terrorists and drug traffickers--who operate beyond the control of states, for purposes ranging from inciting fear to protecting marijuana fields. In light of these three justifications, the military argument goes, a total APL ban would impose unreasonable costs on the good guys, while leaving the bad guys relatively undisturbed. [13] Thus US policymakers argue against a total ban until the military is able to develop a satisfactory alt ernative to APLs.

No doubt these arguments have a certain validity, but APLs cannot be defended simply because under certain circumstances they are useful. Their benefits have to be measured against their costs.

Arguments for a Total Ban

Three sorts of arguments can be marshaled in support of a total ban. The first is a moral argument. According to just war theory and international humanitarian law, landmines are not acceptable because they violate the two universally endorsed principles defining the ultimate limits of organized violence. First, they do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, and, second, the vast, diffuse, long-term costs they impose are generally out of proportion to either the wrong that is being redressed or the good that is being achieved. The force of this argument comes partially from the fact that it is rooted in the most fundamental and common elements of the moral discourses of world politics. [14] It also comes from the widely held conviction that crippling or killing some 26,000 innocent people a year cannot be justified by the fact that this shaves a few dollars from the cost of protecting troops. [15]

A second argument addresses the economy of APLs. According to UN data, about a million landmines are produced each year by a hundred companies operating in about fifty countries. Because APLs can be manufactured at low cost using simple technologies, precise figures are impossible to obtain. [16] But one can suggest that the total value of these sales is probably under $15 million, since the cost of APLs ranges from about $3 to $15. The case of the US supports this reasoning. During the ten years prior to the 1992 moratorium on landmine exports (still in effect), U.S. companies exported about $980,000 worth of mines through ten contracts. Clearly, the economic payoff of the trade in landmines is small.

The economic impact of APLs, however, is enormous. Again, using UN data, health care costs for the 250,000 mine victims alive today will total about $750 million. Estimated costs for providing comprehensive assistance, including rehabilitation and vocational training, for landmine survivors add up to nearly three billion dollars. [17] Furthermore, demining would cost over $30 billion. Add in other costs related to productivity losses, and the total eclipses the economic value by several orders of magnitude.

A final argument concerns the real military value of APLs. Many analysts believe that, in fact, landmines do not win wars and are not at all essential to national security. A 1996 study by the ICRC, for example, concluded that APLs have some tactical value but provide no strategic advantage. [18] They are used primarily in civil conflicts by guerrilla and terrorist groups. [19] These groups use landmines to protect transient encampments, to terrorize civilians and even to depopulate large areas. All things considered, even the United States may be more hindered than helped by landmines, which are designed to offset superior forces. Indeed, a Clinton political appointee to the Pentagon, Timothy Connelly, acting as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, "stirred rancor and suspicion" after his comments regarding DOD's continued insistence on the use of landmines. Following a hearing on the landmine issue on Capitol Hill, Connelly commented that he was there "to defend the indefensible." [20]

Under certain circumstances APLs may be effective. And there is no doubt that they are inexpensive to make and site. But can their micro-utility be justified in light of their macro-costs? Satellite surveillance, computer modeling of enemy movements, and higher density deployment of troops and artillery may allow countries to achieve the same ends with more discriminating means. With the exception of maintaining some APLs for training purposes, the arguments against a total ban are unable to do the work asked of them. This is something that even US leadership recognizes. Why, then, did the US retreat from the total ban initiative?

The American Retreat

In the early 1990s, the US took a leadership role in the landmine debate and orchestrated much of the humanitarian action aimed at alleviating the effects of landmines. In 1992 it became the first state to unilaterally declare an export moratorium on landmines through the Leahy Export Moratorium. [21] The following year the US Senate passed a three-year extension (100-0), which has since been made permanent, and in 1994 Senator Leahy organized the first ever congressional hearing on landmines, "The Global Landmine Crisis." [22] In 1995, Leahy attempted to ban landmines through congressional legislation but was requested by the White House and the Department of Defense to delay introducing legislation until they could formulate a new policy.

Within the context of American domestic politics, the export moratorium established the principle that landmines should be considered categorically different from other types of conventional weapons. Once this principle was accepted, a policy window was established and Senator Leahy moved quickly to try to expand his original legislation to restrict use of and eventually eliminate landmines from US military doctrine and activities. He also sought to reclassify landmines from a security issue to a humanitarian one by taking the issue away from the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and introducing it into the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it received more favorable support.

Senator Leahy's export moratorium legislation became the basis for a US-initiated UNGA resolution urging states "to pursue an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines." [23] This resolution passed 156-0. Indeed, in his September 26, 1994 UN General Assembly speech (written in part by Leahy but not cleared by the US Department of Defense), President Clinton forcefully endorsed the goal of an eventual elimination of landmines. This speech may have had the unintended consequence of he1ping to move the issue further and faster toward a ban than Clinton had imagined possible.

But just as the US effort rose to international prominence, domestic pressures succeeded in very quickly throwing on the brakes. In contrast to the 162 countries supporting the UNGA resolution for the review of the CCW, the United States was one of only three countries that abstained from the vote. Senator Leahy stated that the US abstention "was due to last-minute lobbying by the Pentagon" that opposed "anything that might infringe on the production and use of landmines." [24] President Clinton's response was that "[w]hile we fully supported the overall thrust of the resolution, we could not vote for it because the US Armed Forces continue to require landmines to accomplish certain military missions." [25] Three years later, a spokesman for the Clinton Administration, Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, would reiterate this sentiment at the signing of the MBT in Ottawa: even though we cannot sign at this time, "there should be no mistake about the commitment of the United States to the humanitarian objectives behin d the Convention." [26]

The arguments in favor of a mine ban are as applicable to the US as they are for any other country In addition, the US has several other reasons for supporting a ban:

* This is in line with its position in the early 1990s when the US was acting to clarify the nature of its leadership role in world affairs.

* Landmines are an incidental part of the American defense contractor economy and research and development efforts and have little export value.

* Since 1996 the US has expressed a strong commitment to integrating environmental factors into both security policy and diplomacy APLs, with massive adverse effects on land use, would appear to be a strong candidate for policy resources.

* Finally, it is important for the US to coordinate its military practices with those of its allies and friends. To date, every NATO member has signed the Ottawa treaty except Turkey, and every state in the Western Hemisphere has signed except Cuba, which maintains that it will sign once the US does. As a non-signatory to the treaty the US can be more easily isolated, both legally and politically, on a range of military and diplomatic issues. With ratification of the Ottawa treaty, NATO countries may soon demand that the US military abide by the Ottawa commitments. This would mean the withdrawal of US antipersonnel landmine stockpiles, including mixed mine systems, from NATO countries. Some anti-ban advocates argue that US force reduction requires continued use of landmines as a force multiplier. However, in the changing post-Cold War world, the US is increasingly reliant on its allies as force multipliers. Conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Rwanda have required multi-national responses. Continued US reli ance on landmines adds to the difficulty of managing such operations.

In view of the compelling reasons to support the multilateral effort to ban APLs, US resistance appears almost irrational. Were a handful of Pentagon analysts, anxious about any effort to limit their over-stuffed arsenals, able to undermine a process that was eminently desirable and practical from both American and non-American perspectives?

This would seem to be the most compelling explanation of the US policy reversal. Confronted with a powerful Pentagon characterizing APLs as vital military tools essential to high profile defense activities, the Clinton Administration stepped back from a fast track multilateral process and a supportive Congress. By fragmenting and slowing the process, the US hoped that it would still be able to claim that it was committed to an APL ban, and was simply concerned with identifying the appropriate strategy for making this happen. One plank of this strategy had to be the innovation of a satisfactory military alternative to APLs, so the US would not be handicapped in undertaking to maximize its national security and fulfill its defense related international obligations.

Lurking behind this argument, and a key reason for why it made sense to many Americans, is the idea that the US is an exceptional country in the international system, the world's only superpower, a state subject to demands and challenges that other countries never face and cannot understand. Because of this the US expects at times to stand apart from the rest of the world. [27] This image might actually have a potent unifying function in a country that is increasingly diverse and complex. Hence, regardless of whether the arguments for doing so are sound, Americans can and do take pride in the act of standing alone against the world. Does the U.S really need APLs? Who knows, but if any country has reason to keep these in its arsenal, it must be the US. Indeed, any departure from the status quo--in which the US is the world's only superpower--must be considered very carefully and usually rejected.

Further complicating matters, the US foreign policy arena has expanded enormously in the latter half of the twentieth century. As the boundaries between the domestic and the international erode, virtually every group in the United States--from mid-Western farmers to climate change scientists to Cuban Americans-have issues they want on the foreign policy agenda. Confronted with huge and unrelenting demands, it is perhaps easier for policymakers to stall on issues that elicit strong and immediate criticism, even when it is highly particular, than to try to build a consensus--a project likely to involve a lot of negotiation and trading.

Interestingly, the US had limited success in fragmenting and slowing the multilateral effort to ban APLs. As it slipped away from the table, entrepreneurial middle powers-especially Canada and Norway-seized the initiative and quickly established a treaty process outside the UN system and against US wishes. It is important to note that this process was supported by 122 countries, all of whom signed the MBT, and some thousand NGOs, who provided a variety of educational, advocacy and support services. The US, of course, did not act aggressively to undermine this process; in fact, it was consistent in expressing its support for the ultimate objective of banning APLs. But it could not support the process, and it could not confine it to the UN-based Conference on Disarmament--the slow-moving institution the US promoted as the preferred site for APL discussions. [28]

In short, after leading in the effort to place landmines on the global agenda, the US retreated from--and hence lost control of--the multilateral process it had helped initiate. The objectives of the process had not changed, and the reasons for it remained intact and compelling. Domestic pressures combined with the US's image of itself as an exceptional country wary of change help explain a policy reversal that otherwise appears to make little sense.

Conclusions

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been much discussion of the lack of focus evident in US foreign policy On the one hand, the US is widely perceived as primus inter pares in world affairs--thus what it does is of crucial importance. But on the other hand, on many issues US objectives and strategies are vague, inconsistent and vulnerable. From NATO expansion to environmental rescue, from the Asian economic crisis to political change in Russia, US policymakers are often tentative and unclear. Examining the case of the multilateral effort to ban APLs suggests two factors that might be relevant in explaining this--a complicated domestic arena in which a growing number of stakeholders are weighing into the foreign policy process, and an exceptionalist self-image that undergirds the idea that the US has special needs and privileges in the world and must therefore often stand alone. The cumulative effect of these factors is manifest in the frequent attempt to fragment and slow down multilateral processes, eve n when they are aimed at a public good that the US supports and threatens to impose few costs on the US

Acting in this way, however, raises obvious questions about the ability of the US to provide leadership on new issues challenging humankind. In the case of the landmine ban, the need to act was widely seen to be important and urgent; many countries were persuaded by the compelling arguments in favor of ban; and the US was uncertain about how to proceed. This created conditions for NGOs and entrepreneurial middle powers--here Norway and Canada--to wrestle leadership from the US and develop a viable mechanism for multilateral action without US support. Will the MBT be effective without the US signing on? Time will tell. What is clear is that the absence of US support does not signal the end of multilateral processes seeking to better the plight of humankind.

NOTES

(1.) Formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, Transfer and Production of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, negotiated in Ottawa, Canada in 1996-97.

(2.) Reprinted as Henry R. Luce, The American Century (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).

(3.) For a listing with full text see www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/multilaterals.html.

(4.) For a discussion, see Dorothy V Jones, Code of Peace: Ethics and Security in the World of the Warlord States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

(5.) The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Geneva, 10 October 1980, attached to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious and to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW). An amended form of Protocol II was made available for signature on 3 May 1996.

(6.) According to the ICRC in Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? A study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel landmines, Geneva, March 1996, p. 11.

(7.) See Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?, p. 11 and United Nations Secretary-General Calls High-Level Meeting on Global Landmine Crisis, Information Document for July 5-7, 1995 Meeting.

(8.) Assistance in Mine Clearance, Report to the Secretary-General, Document A/49/357, September 6, 1994, 49th General Assembly, Item 22 (A/49/150), p.l4.

(9.) See//fn2.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/puppydog/landmine.html.

(10.) Kevin M. Cahill, Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis (New York: Council of Foreign Relations; Basic Books, 1995) p. 3.

(11.) Information in this section taken from www.un.org/Depts/dha/mct/facts.html.

(12.) See www.defenslink.mil/news/may1996/x051796_x051bgd.html.

(13.) As explained by John M. Sahlikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a letter: "anti-personnel landmines will be required by US forces for the foreseeable future. Congress and the American people expect us to fight and win conflicts with minimum casualties. That goal requires the retention of the capabilities provided by the advanced self-destructing mine systems which would be prohibited under the proposed legislation."

(14.) For a discussion see David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

(15.) Data from ICRC, The Worldwide Epidemic of Landmine Injuries: The ICRC's health oriented approach, Geneva, 1993, p. 3; and US Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, Report to Congress, December 1994, p. 1.

(16.) See www.un.org/Depts/dha/mct/trade.html.

(17.) "Establishing Baseline Costs for Humanitarian Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Mine-Contaminated Communities," document submitted by the Landmine Survivors Network to The Washington Conference on Global Humanitarian Demining, Washington, D.C., May 20-22, 1998.

(18.) Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?

(19.) Assistance in Mine Clearance, p. 14.

(21.) U.S. Federal Register, Volume 57, p. 228, November 25, 1992; "Suspension of Transfers of Anti-Personnel Mines" (regulations implementing the Landmine Moratorium Act); US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Publication No. 102-484, sec. 1365 (The Landmines Moratorium Act). Since that time Leahy has proposed additional amendments to control landmines.

(20.) Mary McGrory, "Land Mine Fizzle" Washington Post, May 21, 1996, p. A2.

(22.) The Global Landmine Crisis, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, May 13, 1994. Ken Rutherford was one of those providing testimony Other speakers included representatives from international NGOs, domestic interest groups, and the Department of State. The Department of Defense declined its invitation to attend.

(23.) U.N.G.A. Document A/C. 1/48/L.42; Fact Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, May 16, 1997.

(24.) Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Letter to the Editor; New York Times, January 13, 1994.

(25.) Letter from President Bill Clinton to Senator Patrick Leahy dated February 22, 1994 quoted in Cyrus Vance and Herbert S. Okun, "Eliminating the Threat of Land Mines: A New U.S. Policy," in Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. p.204.

(26.) Ambassador Karl F Inderfurth, Special Representative to the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining, Department of State for Global Humanitarian Demining, during a speech at a roundtable entitled "Coordination of Resources for Mine Action" at the Ottawa Treaty signing conference, December 4, 1997.

(27.) As one official testified: "The United States has obligations in the world that arise out of practical circumstances and security concerns of friends, and allies as well as our own."

(28.) As explained by a US official at a Department of Defense press conference: "We don't find the two proposals exclusive. We believe, and the Administration believes, that you could actually pursue this thing on two tracks.... But we do believe that the appropriate forum to solve this problem is through the Conference on Disarmament, which is a U.N. instrument, and which involves a much larger number of countries than does the Ottawa process at this point." June 17, 1997.

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