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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: two initiatives.
by Matt Robson Matt Robson outlines New Zealand's role in promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons. Disarmament and arms control are central to the government's foreign policy. To put it simply, we want to galvanise the international community to come forward, with New Zealand, in seeking the eradication of nuclear weapons. We are under no illusion that progress with disarmament is going to be easy. Or that nuclear weapons' elimination is going to happen soon. Yet we are committed to taking the opportunities that are available to prevent a new nuclear arms race and to work for disarmament. I will focus on two main areas of initiative. The recent NPT Review Conference in New York delivered against all expectations. To summarise, the nuclear weapon states have made an unequivocal commitment to eliminating their weapons and they have signed on to a set of significant new steps that will be monitored and measured in the next five-year review period. The strategy leading to this result, and the significance for New Zealand's wider foreign policy interests, will be outlined below. The New Agenda Coalition emerged after the second preparatory meeting for the 2000,NPT Review Conference had ended in disarray in mid-1998. In itself this failure was, with hindsight, of limited significance, but it marked a turning point. The countries, including New Zealand, which had supported the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 in the context of a package of new nuclear disarmament undertakings and strengthened accountability measures took stock of the progress against the commitments that had been made. What had been achieved fell well short of reasonable expectations. Worse, the failure of the 1998 meeting indicated a sorry lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear weapon states to follow through on the agreements they had entered into with the wider NPT membership. In mid-1998 first India, then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and announced to the world a claim to nuclear weapon state standing. The prescience of the Canberra Commission, reporting in 1996 that `the possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them', was revealed. Convinced that the world was sinking into complacency in the face of the continued threat of around 30,000 amassed nuclear weapons and new aspirants to the club, the New Agenda Coalition came together to issue a wake up call. New Zealand joined Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden in a coalition which crossed the traditional North/ South divide, and escaped the Cold War East-West/non-aligned groupings that act as a kind of `freeze-frame' on disarmament talks. The coalition's agenda was put to the international community through UN resolutions in 1998 and 1999. We received overwhelming support but faced strong resistance from the nuclear weapon states and the countries allied to them. The Labour-Alliance coalition government was formed after the general election in November 1999. Viewed from the perspective of our broad foreign policy interests, the New Agenda Coalition had both a track record and strong potential. Our partners in this group are countries that think creatively and act independently. Each of them carries influence in their regions, including in the regional organisations which address political and security issues such as the Organisation for African Unity, the Organisation of American States, and the European Union. Ireland and Sweden have strong nuclear disarmament credentials shared by the rest, which are also leading members of the nuclear weapon free zones in Africa and Latin America. Individually these coalition partners are leaders in their region and leaders specifically in the field of nuclear disarmament. Natural partners They are in these respects natural partners for New Zealand when it comes to pursuing our nuclear disarmament and, indeed, our wider foreign policy goals. During 2000 the New Agenda Coalition asserted itself as prime player in disarmament negotiations, and proved itself a focused and result-orientated grouping. We were the end game partners with the nuclear weapon states in the final, intense, and ultimately successful, NPT Review Conference negotiation on the package of nuclear disarmament commitments adopted by the conference. We have been working together ever since in Geneva and New York on the next steps, which may include an initiative at the Millennium Summit, and there will certainly be follow-up in the General Assembly's First Committee meeting in October and November. Our stance will be active monitoring, active pressure for implementation -- in short, proactive follow-through. The group has to continue to operate in inter-governmental negotiations in the UN centres, and we have the next steps marked out for the period ahead. But the wider significance of this grouping is the capacity for us to work to influence and mobilise public opinion in those countries where nuclear deterrence and nuclear alliances are still very much the currency of defence and security policy. There is a strong and well-connected non-governmental movement working alongside us. I have no doubt that the peoples of the world, if made more fully aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons that persist in the aftermath of the Cold War, will reject such weapons. They will pressure their governments to renounce their possession and use, even in those countries where such weapons are rationalised as the ultimate self-defence. NATO members and those countries aspiring to membership are one set of countries where we need to work, in parallel with,civil society groups. Ireland and Sweden have a particular stake here. At the other end of the spectrum are the disingenuous non-aligned countries that preach nuclear disarmament but do the opposite. Thanks to the New Agenda Coalition, India and Pakistan (as well as Iraq and North Korea) now have South Africa and Egypt to contend with in non-aligned meetings. Our coalition has repeatedly and persistently denied India's and Pakistan's claims that they have the same status as the five NPT nuclear weapon states, and at the NPT Conference we succeeded in having this affirmed by the entire membership. New dimensions The new dimensions to bilateral and regional relationships that have been opened through the New Agenda Coalition's work interact neatly with the government's new foreign policy directions. Mexico is the home of Latin America's nuclear weapon free zone treaty and is New Zealand's long-time partner against nuclear testing. And our links with Brazil, the leading advocate of a nuclear weapon free southern hemisphere, will soon shift onto a higher level with the establishment of a New Zealand embassy in Brasilia. Our strategy for Latin America, our strategy for nuclear disarmament, intersect with real resonance under the Labour-Alliance coalition government. Our aim is to galvanise world opinion so that nuclear weapons lose any last shred of acceptability in those countries that continue to factor them into their security doctrines. The New Agenda countries can work regionally and internationally to keep the message clear and the goal in sight. We are fortunate to have capable backing in the civil society groups that have rallied behind us -- the `Middle Powers Initiative', which has a strong New Zealand profile; Abolition 2000; and the many global non-governmental organisations that have for so many years kept governments attentive to the threat of nuclear weapons. In the case of New Zealand I want to mention particularly the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. More than this, our work with New Agenda Coalition partners adds a dimension to our bilateral relationships that serves New Zealand's broad foreign policy interests in important countries and regions. Second strand The second strand of initiative in our nuclear disarmament policy is my vision of a southern hemisphere and adjacent areas free of nuclear weapons. The concept was first spoken of in the 1960s. Since then 107 states have constructed the building blocks for a nuclear weapon free southern hemisphere in four treaty-based zones covering Latin America, the South Pacific, South-east Asia and Africa. The Antarctic Treaty and the Seabed Treaty which came into effect in the early 1960s and early 1970s complement the ban on nuclear weapons represented in the four nuclear weapon free zones. With backing from New Zealand and other zone members, Brazil has since 1996 promoted the concept of a nuclear weapon free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas through a General Assembly resolution which calls for co-operation among zone members. We were resisted at the beginning by a range of countries -- and we still do not have the support of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, Israel, India and the Federated States of Micronesia. But, we have persisted and I want to emphasise that 158 countries voted for the latest General Assembly resolution which called for zone members to `explore and implement further ways and means of cooperating among themselves and their treaty agencies'. Solid constituency There is, therefore, a solid constituency for building new links and consolidating the nuclear weapon free status of the existing zones to promote our common goal of a nuclear weapon free world. How can we do that? We are exploring the options with Brazil as a first step. Our idea is to add value to the achievements of the existing nuclear weapon free zones. It should not be forgotten that the first zone in Latin America came into being even before the NPT was adopted. In that continent and in Africa, the establishment of regional zones helped in rolling back the nuclear ambitions of key countries. In our region the South Pacific zone was a vigorous protest against nuclear testing. The four zones offer in their protocols the only legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against zone members. The history of zone-making is, therefore, the history of building on regional common purpose to create the conditions and the pressure for a change in global norms of behaviour. As the Canberra Commission reported in 1996: `Nuclear weapon free zones are part of the architecture that can usefully encourage and support a nuclear weapon free world'. This is our goal. We believe that the spread of such zones around the globe can progressively codify the transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. Further options We have looked very carefully at what are the options for moving forward. One would be the negotiation of new treaty-level commitments by zone members, such as a common amendment or new protocol to the existing zone treaties. Another is a new overarching stand-alone treaty open to all zone members to join. It is not our intention to set off down this path. With 107 members the logistics of such a negotiation would be enormous and the time for a new treaty-level product to come into legal force too long. There would also be considerable complication arising from a lack of uniformity in the provisions of the current four zones. These are among a range of obstacles. But there is another path. We can work together with zone members to promote our common purpose in seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. We can strengthen a common barrier to any future risk of nuclear proliferation in our regions. We can reduce the risk of nuclear attack on states in the region, and of nuclear attack launched from within the region to targets beyond the southern hemisphere. We can do this at a political level by applying collective pressure on the nuclear weapon states to limit the geographical scope of their nuclear doctrines and the deployment of their weapons. We are still considering the best framework for this exercise, but it is an achievable step and it takes us forward in a way that complements and supports the efforts we are making in the New Agenda Coalition. We are opening up a new front of activity, but we are in good company and I am confident that if we persevere we will succeed. Two of the government's initiatives have been discussed above. Of course, we are active across a wider agenda and we particularly want to make a practical contribution to arms control and disarmament in our region. This we will be doing with a special conference to be held early in 2001. We are discussing themes and arrangements with the UN Asia-Pacific Center for Disarmament in New York. We want to bring together for the first time in New Zealand leading experts from the region to address the challenges we face. We want to include South Pacific countries which, in our view, are often overlooked by the United Nations and its agencies working in this area. Disarmament and arms control are central to the Labour-Alliance coalition government's foreign policy. The objective is the eradication of nuclear weapons, but it is recognised that this will not be achieved over night. There are two main areas of initiative. First, at the NPT Review Conference the New Agenda Coalition, of which New Zealand is an active participant, was able to make a substantial contribution. Our aim is to galvanise world opinion against nuclear weapons. Second, New Zealand is promoting a southern hemisphere and adjacent areas free of nuclear weapons. It is seeking to apply collective pressure on the nuclear weapon states to limit the geographical scope of their nuclear doctrines and the deployment of their weapons. Hon Matt Robson is the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control. This article is the edited text of an address which he gave to the NZIIA's Auckland branch on 4 August 2000.
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