Nuclear nonproliferation: time to make it permanent - Term paper / research paper writing service

On April 17, 1995, the more than 170 "states parties" to the 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet in New York to extend the treaty beyond its initial 25 years. The United States is, in the words of President Clinton, "leading the charge for indefinite extension" of the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and a necessary foundation for post-Cold War arms reductions.

The NPT enjoys the widest adherence of any arms control agreement in history. As the only nuclear nonproliferation agreement of global reach, the treaty has codified an international standard of behavior against which even states outside the regime are measured. The NPT has had remarkable success in promoting its three major goals: to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and to foster an end to the arms race and promote general disarmament.

By the time the NPT was negotiated, five countries had openly tested nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. Estimates at the time suggested that this number might be as high as 30 by the late 1970s and who knows how high by now if this emerging trend had been left unchecked. Many argued, and in fact still do, that the impetus for worldwide nuclear weapons proliferation is an unstoppable force. If that is so, then it met an immovable object in the NPT. Although a small (and diminishing) number of "threshold" states have muddied the waters, the 25 years the NPT has been in force have been free of a single addition to this list of declared nuclear powers. It may be difficult to prove that the NPT dissuaded even one state from building a nuclear arsenal, but in light of the marked change in global attitudes toward nuclear proliferation, it is indefensible to contend that it did not. In 1970, a state's declaration of having created a new nuclear arsenal stopped being a point of national pride. The NPT made it a violation of international law.

One needs to know some of the details of the NPT to understand why it is critical to approve an indefinite extension without conditions at the April conference. Article X.2 of the treaty explicitly provides that the NPT parties will meet in 1995 to "decide whether the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty." In short, a majority decision at the conference will be immediately binding on all treaty signatories. No approval by national parliaments will be needed. The treaty's framers included this majority provision because they felt that the extension decision was too important to risk it being held hostage by a single state or group of states.

As a practical matter, the extension conference offers the one and only opportunity for an immediate, legally binding extension decision. A decision to extend the treaty that was made some time after the conference could only be accomplished by amending the NPT, which in turn would require approval by a majority of all states parties to the treaty (including ratification by their national parliaments). This majority would have to include all five nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and all other parties that are current members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors.

It is worth nothing that it took 19 years for the original 98 signatories of the NPT to ratify their decision. It is likely that any effort to make substantive amendments to the treaty, such as an extension not envisioned in the original text, would fail. And even if it did succeed, the ensuing legal ambiguity would give states that are less interested in preserving the integrity of the regime an opportunity to leave the treaty. Trying to extend the treaty by amendment is a very dangerous course.

The United States, together with numerous allies, seeks to build the largest possible majority for indefinite extension without conditions. Several groups of states, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (which includes more than 50 NPT states parties), the South Pacific Forum (which includes 11 NPT parties), and the six Central American states, are already committed through multilateral statements to indefinite extension. Others, including Argentina, Ethiopia, Japan, the Philippines, Peru, and the Republic of Korea, have declared their support for indefinite extension. These states parties to the NPT supporting indefinite extension represent by far the largest plurality behind a single extension option. Many other states are undecided but leaning toward indefinite extension. It is likely that a significant majority of states parties to the NPT will vote in favor of indefinite extension at the April conference, but consensus support seems unlikely. As the head of the U.S. effort to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions, I take very seriously the concerns of those who oppose our efforts, but I maintain that their objections to indefinite extension are not sufficient reason to risk endangering the NPT.

Answering objections

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which represents the interests of the developing non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS), is the source of some opposition to indefinite extension. NAM is reluctant to extend the NPT until substantive progress is made in six areas that it maintains are necessary to ensure NNWS security. Most of what NAM is seeking is desirable, and progress is being made in this direction. But expecting all these demands to be met before the extension conference begins is unrealistic. A careful analysis of the six demands reveals that they should not stand in the way of approving an indefinite extension.

Agreement on a series of deadlines for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT obliges states parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Indefinite extension of the treaty without conditions would reaffirm this commitment. However, conditioning the extension of the NPT on other arms control and disarmament objectives risks the worst of both worlds. For instance, if the NPT extension were conditioned on a specific series of time-bound disarmament objectives and if the deadlines were not met, some NPT states parties might argue that the NPT should cease to exist, or that they no longer felt bound by their obligations under the treaty. The double loss of failing to meet the arms control objective and losing the NPT would be a tremendous setback on the long and difficult road toward a nuclear-free world.

The revolutionary disarmament agreements of the past few years were not reached according to a series of deadlines and this has turned out to be advantageous. Who could have anticipated the significant progress we have been able to make since the end of the Cold War? In recent years, the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union have destroyed more than 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, thus eliminating an entire class of weapons systems through the implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In addition, they have agreed in the START I and START II treaties to reduce their strategic nuclear forces by more than two-thirds from pre-START levels. The United States has also unilaterally eliminated 90 percent of its nonstrategic nuclear forces, and Russia has moved to remove thousands of its own tactical nuclear forces. The United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union are disarming as quickly as technical limitations will permit, with the United States dismantling its arsenal at the rate of up to 2,000 nuclear weapons per year.

By the year 2003, 79 percent of the total U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile will have been eliminated. About 59 percent has been eliminated thus far. Through the leadership of Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), we are aiding Russia in its effort to safely and securely dismantle the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Just to implement current agreements, we will need to continue this rapid dismantlement into the next century.

On March 1, President Clinton took another significant step on the road to disarmament by permanently removing 200 tons of fissile material - enough for thousands of nuclear weapons - from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. He took this action specifically in the context of his reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to comply with Article VI. Making the NPT permanent would be a giant step in the direction of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Adherence by the nuclear weapon states to "nuclear weapon free zone" (NWFZ) agreements, especially in the Middle East and Africa. South Africa's unprecedented dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program has cleared the way for an imminent African NWFZ treaty. The United States has been on record since 1964 in support of the denuclearization of Africa and supports the concept of this being achieved through a treaty. The text of this treaty is not yet final, but the United States is studying the possibility of becoming a protocol party to the final treaty, as we are with the Latin American NWFZ treaty, often called the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, the prototypical NWFZ agreement, prohibits 30 of the 33 Latin American states (all but Cuba have signed, wheras St. Lucia and St. Kitts/Nevis have signed but not yet ratified the treaty) from using, stationing, storing, deploying, reprocessing, manufacturing, or testing a nuclear explosive device.

Signing and ratifying both protocols to this treaty obligates the United States not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in territories within the zone for which the United States is internationally responsible, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American states for which the treaty is in effect, and not to store, install, or deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of any such state. The United States is also studying the possibility of becoming a protocol party to the 1987 Treaty of Raratonga, which established the South Pacific NWFZ.

Completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although conclusion of a CTBT by the April conference appears unlikely, clear progress can be seen. In January, 1995, the United States dropped its proposal for a 10-year withdrawal provision in the CTBT and extended the U.S. testing moratorium until the conclusion of a CTBT, clearing the way for more rapid negotiation. Completion of a CTBT at the earliest possible date is one of the foremost arms control goals of the administration.

Conclusion of a treaty providing legally binding security assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China have engaged in serious and constructive discussions to provide the NNWS parties to the NPT with updated security assurances. In 1968, United Nations Security Council Resolution 255 recognized the pledges by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union that they would assist any NNWS party to the NPT that was threatened with aggression involving nuclear weapons or that had such weapons used against it. This so-called "positive security assurance" resolution also recognizes that such use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would trigger immediate action by the Security Council - especially by its permanent members - under the United Nations Charter. Finally, it reaffirms the right of individual and collective self-defense in the event of armed attack until peace and security are restored through measures taken by the Security Council. We expect that these assurances will be updated, with France and China being added now that they are NPT states parties.

In 1978, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union also extended negative security assurances (pledges not to use nuclear weapons against other states) to the NWWS. The United States has stated that it "will not use nuclear weapons against any NNWS party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a NWS, or associated with a NWS in carrying out or sustaining the attack." Although other NWS pledges differ somewhat in their wording, taken together they provide a significant commitment not to use nuclear weapons against the NNWS. There is a good prospect that the five NWS countries will agree on a U.N. Security Council resolution that takes note of positive and negative security assurances by the five declared NWS in time for the extension conference.

Conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons that is nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable, and universally applicable. In a September 1993 speech at the United Nations, President Clinton proposed a "fissile material cutoff" treaty that would cap the amount of material available for nuclear explosives. It could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of certain non-NPT states under some measure of international restraint for the first time. Equally important to NAM, it would prevent any further production of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons in the NWS. We hope negotiations on a multilateral cutoff agreement will begin soon at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Guaranteeing free and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for developing NNWS. The Non-Aligned Movement complains that the nuclear powers are not adhering to this principle, in part because the NWS will not share nuclear technology with Iran. Using this unique case as an example of ill will on the part of the nuclear supplier states in their observance of their Article IV commitments to promote and share peaceful nuclear technology is disingenuous. Iran is a unique case, and prudence will continue to dictate the policies of the nuclear suppliers of the world in this one isolated instance. The record of the world's nuclear supplier states with respect to Article IV compliance is strong, and no state other than Iran can document a single case of denial of access based on export-control criteria.

Nondiscriminatory nonproliferation

The NPT is sometimes characterized as "discriminatory" because it admits five members to the nuclear club but locks out all others. But the treaty did not create nuclear weapon haves and have-nots. It only reflected the reality that already existed in the 1960s, while committing all states parties, including the NWS, to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to the end of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is the one and only legally binding instrument committing the nuclear weapons states to seek nuclear disarmament. The health of that commitment is tied to the health of the NPT regime. Although nuclear disarmament is an important goal of the NPT, it is not the principal focus of the treaty. The NPT's central benefit remains as it was originally envisioned: promoting confidence among states parties that their neighbors and regional rivals are not building nuclear weapons.

The completion of the African NWFZ will bring the number of countries committed to such agreements to almost 100, including a majority of both NPT parties and NAM members. States that have already forsworn their own nuclear option in a NWFZ agreement have nothing to gain and much to lose by jeopardizing the NPT. They have already wisely and profitably traded their nuclear weapons option for regional security. With the NPT in place, these states reaffirm their commitment to nonproliferation but gain additional global security benefits, such as as table and nearly universal nonproliferation regime. Maintaining a robust and permanent NPT is the first and best way for NNWS to contribute to the goal of disarmament.

One of the more outspoken critics of indefinite extension has likened the tolerance of nuclear weapons to the tolerance of slavery. This is not an apt comparison. The effectiveness of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements is not measured by their egalitarianism, but by their contributions to international security. Another vocal critic of indefinite extension has complained of the NPT's discriminatory nature by saying, "The point is this: Let nuclear technology be available to everybody because of the psychology of wanting to know exactly what it looks like. Let everyone experience it. If in experiencing it, it becomes distasteful, then of course the basis of equality would have been established." The fact is that if the world were to insist on a reflexive nuclear equality, the likely result would be a leveling up, not a leveling down; not a world freed of nuclear weapons but a world filled with nuclear weapons states.

The contention that the NPT could be used as a lever to advance other arms control efforts has no merit. The idea that a less-than-indefinite extension of the NPT will hold the NWS's "feet to the fire" is a myth. The NWS, like all states, establish their policy regarding nuclear weapons on the basis of their security interests. The world can produce no greater threat to the NWS than the specter of nuclear devastation we lived under for years during the Cold War. Disarmament cannot be compelled by threats. It must be built, as peace must be built, on a foundation of mutual security and confidence.

Most of the world has already committed itself to never build nuclear weapons. But right now they risk letting a few bad apples spoil the barrel by allowing radical arguments from states that harbor nuclear ambitions to sway them against indefinite NPT extension. Disarmament might happen without the NPT but it will be a lot less likely.

North Korea and Iraq

Some would cite the efforts of North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons as evidence that the NPT is weak, but this belies a basic misunderstanding of the key role the NPT plays in preventing nuclear proliferation. In the case of Iraq, IAEA has carded out inspections of unprecedented scope under a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. The lesson of Iraq led IAEA to take steps to ensure that such cases of noncompliance do not occur in the future. IAEA implementation of its right to conduct "special inspections" has been revitalized. In addition, the IAEA "93-Plus-Two" program, which will recommend additional measures to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities, is nearly complete. Furthermore, responding to a violation of law by punishing the law itself is, to put it mildly, ill-advised. Certainly the existing international non-proliferation regime admits room for improvement, but it is the NPT regime that provides a ready foundation for such improvement.

Another objection often raised to indefinite extension is that certain "threshold states" are not parties to the NPT. What this argument fails to consider is that the number of these states has been dramatically reduced in recent years. South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina have turned away from development of nuclear weapons. All three non-Russian newly independent states that had Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on their territory have become NNWS parties to the NPT. All told, 37 new states have acceded to the NPT since the 1990 review conference. More are expected to do so in the near future.

Three remaining holdouts, Israel, India, and Pakistan, are growing ever more isolated on this issue of greatest importance to the international community. The best way to encourage them to meet the international norm of nonproliferation is to keep the pressure on them by making the chief bulwark of that norm, the NPT, permanent. Egypt has stated that it will not support a long extension of the NPT unless Israel takes a "concrete step" in the direction of eventually joining the NPT. I have visited Egypt and Israel in the past year as part of the U.S. effort to help resolve this issue, and the United States is very supportive of their efforts to do so. But these are sovereign states that have significant security concerns and it remains up to them to come to agreement. We do not intend to force the solution. Both states recognize that the NPT is in their national security interest. We very much want Israel to join the NPT, and we want all countries to support its permanence. We are taking action to promote both of those objectives. But ultimately only the states involved can resolve this dispute.

Consensus

One objection to indefinite. extension of the NPT without conditions is that such a decision is unlikely to garner consensus support, so that a bare majority will be able to set the treaty regime. But that is exactly what the treaty's framers intended. Article X.2 specifically envisions the extension decision being made by majority vote. The rationale for this provision is that the extension decision is too important to risk it being held hostage to a consensus decision.

Those who oppose indefinite extension on the grounds that compromise should be sought to allow consensus are operating on the false premise that all states are equally committed to permanent nonproliferation. This is not the case. Some of the most radical opposition to indefinite extension comes from countries that may not be completely committed to nuclear nonproliferation. For instance, spokespersons for Nigeria have argued in the past that although Nigeria is poor now, were economic conditions to change, Nigeria might want to acquire nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has articulated the U.S. view that Iran, a ringleader of opposition to indefinite extension, is engaged in a "crash course" to develop nuclear weapons. These countries appear to be seeking to use the extension decision to keep their nuclear weapons option open.

The opponents of indefinite extension want to polarize the issue by portraying indefinite extension as an extreme position. The flaw in their argument is that indefinite extention is the middle ground because permanent nonproliferation is the NPT's central goal. Proposals specifically designed to allow some states to continue to flirt with the nuclear option cannot be compared with responsible proposals for permanent nonproliferation. The goals are not equivalent. Simply splitting the difference does not yield an acceptable outcome. For illustration, imagine the world community as a group of friends trying to decide how to spend an afternoon together. Sixty want to play baseball, others talk about basketball, soccer, and even modern dance, but a handful want to rob a liquor store. Talking the small minority down to a "consensus" agreement to steal hubcaps would not be a successful compromise.

It is important that the impending vote on indefinite extension of the NPT be understood for what it is: a near-global referendum on nuclear proliferation. A vote for indefinite extension is a vote against nuclear weapons. It will not abolish them in a stroke, but it will move the world much further down the path to their ultimate abolition than any other broad multilateral action ever has.

The Review and Extension Conference presents the one opportunity the world has to permanently codify the strongest and most widely adhered-to norm against nuclear proliferation. Opponents of indefinite extension are standing aloof from the most certain opportunity for substantial arms control progress that has ever presented itself. They risk not only the future of arms control and disarmament but also past gain. We hope and expect that a large majority of the world will support indefinite extension without conditions. We are sure that those who do not will regret not taking this opportunity to be counted among the nations of the world who are truly committed to nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.

Thomas Graham, Jr., who holds the rank of ambassador, is Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament.

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