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Nuclear weapons and disarmament realities: past, present and future

Nuclear weapons and disarmament realities: past, present and future.

by John Simpson

John Simpson discusses the problems and prospects of achieving non-proliferation and non-possession of nuclear weapons.

We currently live in an era where, for the first time for half a century, the global elimination of nuclear weapons appears possible, though not yet probable. The five nuclear-weapon states, who also happen to be the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have been for the last six years in a relationship other than acute political hostility, and their need for such weapons for their own security is no longer so self-evident as it was prior to 1991. This in itself will not be sufficient to produce the elimination of nuclear weapons: other changes in the perspectives that states and their leaders hold about nuclear weapons will be necessary. But such changes are not impossible: the `realist' perspective that suggests that a universal, determinist logic applies to attitudes and policies towards such weapons is demonstrably open to question, at the very least.

From the early 1950s onwards, the pervading concern influencing the implementation of `pure [nuclear] deterrence', and thus strategic nuclear weapon policies and doctrines, was to counter the possible disarming consequences of a surprise attack. Since 1991, this picture has changed radically. Concern now is over actions resulting from inadvertence and accident, rather than malevolence. Although a limited, residual state of mutual threat and deterrence can still be perceived to exist between the United States and Russia, political change has meant that a purposeful surprise disarming strike is no longer the threat driving strategic nuclear weapon procurement and operations. This development seems likely to be strengthened with the imminent entry of officers and officials of Russia into the corridors of NATO headquarters on a permanent basis.

This same political change has also allowed developments in weapon technologies to impact fully upon thought and action concerning the role of nuclear weapons in `indirect' deterrence. From the late 1960s onwards, precision guided munitions started to make it unnecessary to mount nuclear warheads on missiles and aircraft to compensate for delivery inaccuracies, but the full impact of these developments was not felt until 1991, when both the Cold and Gulf wars ended. The consequence was that nuclear warheads were removed from almost all their `war-fighting' roles by NATO. Yet the concept now seems to have made a reappearance in Russia to offset conventional military weakness, despite technological disarmament having advanced so rapidly that reports suggest that almost all the non-strategic weapons in Russia will cease to be capable of reliable operation by 2005, with no obvious means or money being available to replace them.

Global numbers of immediately available operational weapons have therefore declined radically since 1991, with total numbers of warheads on `hair-trigger' alert in Russia now probably not exceeding 500. Two sets of questions flow from this:

* What are the doctrinal implications of having a much reduced portion of the inventories of nuclear weapons committed to time-urgent tasks?

* What will be the impact upon such inventories of the continuing processes of block obsolescence, design-life expiry, aging, and lack of priority for financial and other resources to sustain nuclear arsenals?

Low risk

The post-2000 security environment seems likely to be characterised by political and security uncertainties, but a low risk of catastrophic global nuclear conflict. The nuclear-weapon states may need to adjust their policies to the changing realities of a world where:

* nuclear weapons will not be as salient to them as in the past;

* resources available for them will be significantly constrained;

* a nuclear test moratorium will place the emphasis on maintaining existing physics packages, rather than on developing new ones; and

* articulating the need for nuclear weapons on anything other than a `come in handy' basis will become increasingly difficult.

It could also be a world where elements in the United States will decide to press for global nuclear disarmament, on the basis that it would enhance its power projection capabilities. On the other hand, the security pressures that drove the United States and the Soviet Union to use nuclear deterrence as the backbone of their political relationship will still persist in other areas of the world--the Indian sub-continent; the Middle East; and East Asia.

One consequence may be that the future global nuclear security and arms control agenda will consist of two elements:

* how to translate what is actually occurring to the nuclear weapons and doctrines of the permanent five into binding undertakings to cap numbers and to deploy the majority of weapons in a `storage' rather then `quick reaction alert', posture;

* how to deal with the de facto nuclear-weapon capabilities of India, Israel and Pakistan.

Ultimately, the willingness of the nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapon stockpiles will depend on them changing their current perceptions that these weapons are vital for their security. Yet they will probably be reluctant to make such a judgment so long as the de facto nuclear-weapon states retain their capabilities--except in the unlikely event that they are confident they can deploy a `leak-proof' nuclear defence system And given the more acute security situation of the de facto nuclear-weapon states, removal of their capabilities is unlikely to happen unless the same type of political transition occurs in their regions as has occurred in Europe. In this situation, therefore, what are the prospects for the further institutionalising and strengthening of nuclear non-possession and non-proliferation norms?

To address this question, it seems necessary to seek answers to four specific questions:

* What further agreements need to be, and can be, negotiated in the nuclear weapons area?

* What arrangements need to be made for implementing existing agreements?

* What precisely does non-possession involve?

* How will the conflict between non-possession and non-proliferation evolve, and what will be its impact upon the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime?

Continuing stalemate

The negotiating track to institutionalising non-possession norms seems likely to be stalemated on a global level for the foreseeable future. The central issue which confronts both the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the NPT review activities is whether the process of nuclear weapon elimination should be viewed as:

* a static `blueprint' one, in which an unequivocal political commitment to its completion by the nuclear-weapon states (and by India, Israel and Pakistan) through a number of fixed, time-bound steps contained in a nuclear weapons convention is a necessary next step, and some would appear to be arguing a sufficient one, to guarantee the achievement of this objective, or

* a dynamic and adaptive one, in which nuclear-weapon elimination is viewed as an incremental process of actions, partial agreements and changing perceptions.

This stalemate masks a lack of clear vision of how the multilateral nuclear disarmament process might progress in an incremental manner beyond the fissile production ban. While some may argue that this can be overcome were agreement to be reached to hold a fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament before the end of the decade, it is equally likely that without some prior agreement on the future nuclear-weapon negotiating agenda, there will be no special session. The outlook for the multilateral negotiating path to norm building thus looks decidedly bleak, with the possible exception of the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones

Similar outlook

A similar outlook can be argued to exist in the START process, although here the problem revolves more around the failure of legislatures to ratify existing agreements, and fear that they will refuse to ratify new ones, than any lack of vision concerning the scope of new agreements.

The irony is that despite this stalemate, it seems inevitable that age and lack of resources will drive warhead numbers down in a semi-autonomous manner over the next decade. This in turn leads one to ask:

* Will it be possible and is it desirable to negotiate agreements to cap these lower numbers?

* How can progress be made in safeguarding materials and technology released from retired weapons--and in lengthening the time for reconstitution of these weapons?

* Might it be possible to negotiate agreements to create greater transparency over warhead numbers and fissile material production and stocks in the nuclear-weapon states?

* How can this retirement and dismantling activity be related to the non-possession norm underpinning the NPT?

If the negotiating path towards disarmament remains blocked, no effective methods will be available to institutionalise decreases in numbers and make them irreversible. Some progress can be made through agreements on the transfer of fissile materials from military stockpiles in the nuclear-weapon states to IAEA safeguards, and the application of such safeguards in future on material emerging from reactors and enrichment plants in these states, but more sweeping commitments seem out of reach.

Major debate

A major debate will shortly take place within the UN General Assembly on the priorities to be assigned to disarmament negotiations, as against measures to assist with the implementation of existing agreements. A web of agreements have been created to combat the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, and some would argue that their implementation has equal priority for resources with negotiating additional ones. This is likely to be opposed by those states which regard this as a thinly disguised attempt to reduce the resources available for negotiating new disarmament agreements, and to impose additional constraints on them.

The outcome of this debate could serve to institutionalise further the non-possession norm as it applies to non-nuclear-weapon states, but it is more likely to result in a stalemate if attempts are made to raise the noncompliance of the nuclear-weapon states with Article VI of the NPT in this context. Yet even if the UN Secretariat is restructured to give equal significance to both the implementation and negotiation of disarmament agreements, it will not necessarily strengthen compliance procedures where this is most needed: to generate a greater expectation that the Security Council will act if faced with a case of non-compliance. Although the Iraq case has indicated what the Security Council can do, the North Korean one demonstrated its limitations.

Key issue

Although the Advisory Opinion of the International Court determined that the permanent five did commit themselves to conclude nuclear disarmament agreements through the NPT, there has been little debate on what this implies in practice, or of the collateral measures that might be necessary to achieve this objective. Recent analyses have suggested that nuclear disarmament will equate to a state of virtual proliferation or non-weaponised deterrence: the key issue would be the time needed to reconstitute a nuclear force, and how many warheads could be made operational in a limited period of time. In short, a potential crisis nuclear arms race. It remains uncertain if this situation would be more or less stable than a low salience nuclear world: much would probably depend on political circumstances. Equally, it remains unclear how the transition to a minimally armed world could be accomplished without encouraging the `conventionalisation' of nuclear weapons, once the threat of global catastrophe from weapon use recedes.

Finally, one suspects that few of the developing states which advocate nuclear disarmament have assessed the consequences for them of a world where American conventional military power would become more prominent: where nuclear disarmament would not undermine and destroy the global power structure but would rather reinforce it. This is not to argue against seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons, merely to point out that although the term may be an effective political slogan, none of these issues have yet been adequately explored, nor unfortunately does there appear to be any obvious way for international institutions to do so.

Rapid progress

It seems clear that rapid progress is unlikely in the immediate future in negotiating further institutionalisation of non-possession norms. This seems to suggest that the current conflict over the implementation of non-possession and non-proliferation norms will continue into the indefinite future. One way of viewing this is that it is an inevitable consequence of the way the existing non-proliferation regime has been constructed, but that security self-interest will prevent non-nuclear-weapon states seeking to withdraw from the NPT or otherwise weaken the regime. Another is to ask whether there may be ways to argue that Article VI is being fulfilled, despite the lack of progress in negotiations.

Two issues become central at this point. One is the option to consolidate the reductions in weapon numbers that have taken place via a ban on the production of fissile material, greater transparency and placing former military material under IAEA safeguards. A second is agreements, tacit or otherwise, to constrain the ways in which nuclear warheads are deployed and nuclear delivery systems operated. Disarmament advocates, however, are likely to characterise such proposals as unnecessary distractions to the achievement of their objective, while those advocating retention of weapons are likely to regard them as de facto disarmament, and thus movement down a slippery slope.

Practical problem

The practical problem with the NPT has always been that some states viewed it as primarily a nuclear disarmament treaty and others as a nonproliferation one. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two distinct objectives, even if they are linked to a common norm, as both are based on the destructive qualities possessed by those weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons by others does not condition the need to prevent additional states acquiring them.

Events in 1991 triggered major changes in both the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear weapon context, to the point where future options for further institutionalisation of the former appear limited to the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and strengthening enforcement mechanisms. The changes also left the states within the regime facing stark choices with regard to three of the five states which are non-parties to the NPT, and are usually regarded as de facto nuclear-weapon states: business as usual seems unlikely to persuade them to accede to the NPT, while if they were to become overt nuclear-weapon states this would create a class of states incompatible with the provisions of the NPT.

Ambiguous stance

These three non-party states appear to be motivated in their ambiguous nuclear-weapon stance, at least in part, by the regional conflicts that they are involved in. By contrast, similar acute security pressures are no longer driving the policies of the five de jure nuclear-weapon states, leading to reductions in global warhead numbers and less emphasis on the need to safeguard forces against surprise attack. Conflicts will continue within the UN and elsewhere over the priority and resources to be allocated to the implementation of existing agreements, rather than the negotiation of new ones, while it seems probable that numbers of warheads will continue to decline, but not as a direct consequence of negotiations. However, the end state of this process of disarmament remains problematic, as does its stability and that of the intermediate phases that will have to be traversed to achieve it. These are issues that have yet to be analysed and debated in practical detail, rather than on the basis of normative advocacy. Until they are, and disarmament negotiations catch up with the realities of the existing disarmament process, the normative debate at the heart of the NPT regime seems destined to persist, and serve to generate continued uncertainty concerning the long term viability of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as international policy objectives.

Changed perception

The changes in perception concerning the assumptions which underlay thinking about nuclear weapons and their proliferation in the 1950s and 1960s serve to remind us that arms limitation, and the perceptions underpinning it, are part of a dynamic process. Let me conclude by asking five open-ended questions derived from those changes to which I have no easy answers, but which appear to have relevance to these matters:

* To what extent is current thinking concerning nuclear weapons driven by the unique circumstances of the `Cold War', rather than ahistorical political and technological forces? And if so, what will replace this Cold War `conceptual overhang' as the basis for discussion and action on these issues?

* To what extent has the fifty-two year taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, and by extension the lack of incentive for their possession, been based upon factors other than the qualitatively different nature of the destructive potential of such weapons?

* If traditional designs of nuclear weapons are no longer the `most lethal or modern' weapons, what will replace them in this role, and what will be the impact of such changes upon future perspectives on nuclear weapons?

* Are the IAEA and regional nuclear organisations capable of sustaining confidence in their ability to detect diversion of fissile material from peaceful uses or its clandestine production and manufacture into weapons? Is the United Nations capable of handling politically those cases of non-compliance that such organisations uncover?

* Will the current emphasis upon `pure', rather than `indirect', deterrence persist, or will `conventional' military considerations re-emerge as a powerful motive for nuclear-weapon possession? And will the existence of states with advanced conventional military capabilities serve as a stimulus for nuclear proliferation, even if at the same time they may also offer incentives for some of the permanent five to move towards nuclear weapon elimination?

The end of the Cold War has provided an opportunity to pursue the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. But the reduction of warheads seems likely to result more from obsolescence and reduced salience than from formal negotiations. There are many issues connected with the preferred end state of the disarmament process that have still to be analysed and debated in detail--and until they are the long-term viability of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament as international policy objectives must remain uncertain.

Dr John Simpson is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Mountbatten Institute for International Studies at the University of Southampton. This article is an extract from the text of an address which he gave to the NZIIA's Wellington branch on 26 June 1997.

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