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The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament--The U.S. View.
by John D. Holum On the eve of its 50th anniversary of independence, India has puzzled other countries by its stance toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Although India has historically championed the objective of global nuclear disarmament, its efforts to obstruct the recent Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have sent mixed signals to the international community This article will discuss concerns regarding the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, provide the U.S. perspective with respect to India's position on the CTBT and the security debate within India, and outline the approach most of the world is taking to achieve the ultimate global elimination of nuclear weapons. Introduction Today, India is at an important crossroads, poised to expand its economic and political influence and play a larger role in world affairs. One of the world's 10 big emerging markets, in the view of many economists India has the potential to achieve a 6 to 7 percent growth rate over the next several years. The economic liberalization program it has undertaken has begun to expand India's international trade and encourage foreign investment opportunities in areas such as power generation, telecommunications, roads and ports. India seems to be intent on improving relations with its Asian neighbors. In December 1996, India concluded a historic water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh, putting an end to 25 years of disagreement. This followed a November water-sharing agreement with Nepal. India is now a full dialogue partner with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It hopes to become a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. India has also endeavored to improve its relations with China. The December 1996 visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to New Delhi both highlighted this improvement and produced a 12 point agreement designed to expand confidence-building measures and reduce tension along the Indo-Chinese border. Such developments should contribute to reducing India's long-term security concerns about China and help lay the groundwork for closer Sino-Indian economic cooperation. It is too early to judge the success of resumed dialogue with Pakistan, but here too, prospects look favorable. Each of these developments demonstrates India's potential to become a leading actor on the world stage. Despite these many positive factors, the international community is perplexed by the mixed signals India has been sending on the nuclear disarmament issue. For more than 40 years, Indian leaders have championed nuclear disarmament. It was Jawaharlal Nehru who in 1954 first called for a ban on nuclear weapon testing and on fissile material production for nuclear weapons.(1) Yet in September 1996, New Delhi sought to block the completion of the comprehensive test ban and said it would not sign the Treaty. Since then, India has tied its support for other multilateral steps toward disarmament to an agreement to negotiate disarmament in a timebound framework. To many of India's friends, this apparent shift is puzzling. Just as the international community has begun to move in the direction India has advocated for decades, New Delhi appears to be unwilling to join in steps, such as the test ban, that are widely recognized as critical to the nuclear disarmament process. India's stance is all the more puzzling because of its longstanding role as a champion of disarmament within the NonAligned Movement. For years, India has led Non-Aligned Movement efforts to promote disarmament and to complete intermediate steps such as a CTBT and a cutoff of the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Yet today, while India appears unwilling to embrace such agreements, the majority of Non-Aligned Movement states have chosen to work with the international community to achieve practical progress on the disarmament agenda. Japan's victory over India for a rotational seat on the U.N. Security Council in 1996 has prompted some in India and elsewhere to wonder if the extent of the loss (142 to 40) was not in part due to the positions New Delhi had recently taken on nuclear disarmament issues. For example, the vote on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty resolution at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1996 was 158 in favor and three against, with five abstentions. The only countries voting with India against the resolution were Bhutan, a country whose foreign policy India strongly influences, and Libya. Previously, in May 1995, the near-universal membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extended that Treaty indefinitely Today there are 185 parties to that Treaty, which India has long rejected. Rather than seek to limit extension of the Treaty; the countries concluded that their security would be strengthened by making the NPT a permanent part of the international security architecture. In addition to extending the NPT, the parties also voiced their support for the type of step-by-step disarmament process that India now appears unwilling to support.(2) While all states agree on the goal--the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons--some do not agree on how to get there. India, for example, has called for negotiations on nuclear disarmament within a timebound framework. While a specific time frame may sound attractive in the abstract, most states believe it to be unrealistic. As will be discussed in greater detail below, achieving the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons depends on many factors. Chief among these are steps to strengthen international security and create conditions allowing states with nuclear weapons to reduce their reliance on them over time. Such steps can be taken at all levels--unilaterally; bilaterally, regionally and globally However, it is simply unrealistic to think 40 years of a nuclear arms race can be canceled out overnight. But the CTBT, the Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty and bilateral U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions are building a strong and durable foundation for further tangible disarmament measures. Nuclear Weapon Proliferation and South Asia Anyone who has studied the security situation in South Asia is aware of the triangular dynamic that has evolved over the 23 years since India conducted its so-called peaceful nuclear explosion. Although Pakistan has tried to match its neighbor and has undoubtedly concerned New Delhi, in public India has tended to focus on what it regards as a long-term security threat from China. Today, both India and Pakistan have nuclear ambitions, have acquired aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons and are actively pursuing missile delivery capability as well. Were this situation to worsen, for example by further nuclear testing or the deployment of nuclear weapons by either country, a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms race would likely ensue. While the likelihood of another war between India and Pakistan is low, the two states have fought three wars--in 1947, 1965 and 1971--and came close to military conflict in 1986/87 and again in 1990. Confidence-building measures that were put in place after the 1990 crisis have fallen into disuse.(3) Publicly reported violations of these agreements have gone unaddressed and in fact, may actually have contributed to an increase in tension. Unless the recently resumed dialogue between India and Pakistan can address this tension, the potential for a future clash remains. With nuclear weapons, such a conflict would be immeasurably worse. U.S.-Soviet Experience with Nuclear Weapons Some in South Asia may ask, if the United States and the Soviet Union could safely manage a nuclear competition, could not South Asia do the same? Perhaps--but despite our advanced military capabilities, the history of the U.S.-Soviet arms race was fraught with risks, instabilities, high costs, extreme dangers and tempered by luck. It is not a history our countries would choose to repeat. To be sure, a number of factors influence a country's decision to pursue nuclear capabilities. All too often, however, these decisions can be influenced by unavoidable misperceptions about another state's activities. Driven by conservative worst-case assumptions, an "action-reaction" dynamic can fuel an arms race and lead to an ever more dangerous and potentially destabilizing situation. While countries hope to be in control of this dynamic, as observers have noted about the U.S.-Soviet arms race, it can take on a life of its own. In the early 1960s, for example, the U.S. misperception that the Soviet Union had greater numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles--the so-called missile gap--led to an acceleration in missile production under U.S. President John F. Kennedy which, among other factors, likely contributed to the Soviet Union's decisions to accelerate its own programs. This prompted each side to consider anti-missile defenses, which in turn gave impetus to efforts to "MIRV" missiles by placing multiple warheads atop ballistic missiles, in part to saturate missile defenses.(4) In short, weapons became more dangerous and potentially destabilizing--all in the quest for a secure peace. Potential instabilities emerged not only from this buildup of forces, but also from the difficult decisions made with regard to nuclear weapons deployment. Each side spent many billions of dollars on elaborate command and control systems. Still, nuclear accidents and miscalculations that could have led to an inadvertent nuclear exchange were not unknown. For example, it is now clear that the Soviet Union and the United States came far closer to the brink of nuclear war during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis than was known at the time. Thirty years after the fact, newly released historical records portray American and Soviet leaders making decisions that could have led to a nuclear war based on incomplete and in some cases incorrect information. At one point during the crisis, the United States considered an invasion of Cuba, operating under the assumption that there were no nuclear weapons yet in place. Yet, it was learned later, approximately 60 intermediate range and 100 tactical warheads had already arrived. Had the United States decided to invade Cuba, the Soviet Union might well have responded with a nuclear at tack from the island.(5) Additionally both Russians and Americans know the strain a nuclear weapons competition can place on a country's economy, The United States spent hundreds of billions of dollars over 50 years on developing and maintaining its nuclear stockpile. We are only now beginning to pay the enormous additional cost associated with shrinking our nuclear arsenal, including the associated environmental clean-up. At the same time, the United States is rebuilding its civilian infrastructure, which suffered substantially during the Cold War. The strain on the Soviet Union's economy was even more debilitating. South Asia This Cold War history would be dangerous for any state to repeat. In South Asia, where short-flight ballistic missiles could be deployed near the Indo-Pakistani border, the virtual lack of attack warning could exacerbate the kind of dangerous instabilities that drove the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition.(6) During periods of crisis, military leaders may not have time to determine if an attack is underway before being forced to decide whether and how to respond. Further, India and Pakistan would likely deploy land-mobile missiles whose command and control is inherently difficult and particularly costly because of unique technical problems involved in moving launchers and missiles and communicating between command centers and mobile field units. Moreover, a nuclear arms race in South Asia would have serious implications not only for regional security but for international security as well. Even a nuclear arms race that did not end in war would be an unfortunate setback for South Asia, as it would be for the world's efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and move toward their ultimate elimination. Nuclear disarmament depends on two interdependent requirements: States that possess nuclear weapons must take steps toward their elimination and states that do not possess such weapons should agree not to acquire them. Moreover, all states must contribute to improvements in regional and international security, in order to create the security environment in which nuclear disarmament can take place. In contrast, were India to deploy nuclear weapons, concerns in neighboring regions would increase and could cause some countries in East Asia and the Middle East to rethink their non-nuclear weapon status. Likewise, it is unclear what the reaction would be from China and Russia. Rather than a world moving toward nuclear disarmament, we could see a world moving toward new nuclear arms races. Decisions by India and Pakistan to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons would also run counter to current global trends that identify the robustness and strength of a country's economy as the key measure of its stature. It is no accident that Japan and Germany--countries that have forsaken nuclear weapons and that have become powerful industrial and exporting centers--are now two of the most important and influential countries in the world and the two most likely to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council if it is expanded. In the Pacific Rim, many other countries that are prominent as emerging powers--South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia--are attaining influence not from a nuclear weapons program, but from their ability to increase living standards and participate actively in international commerce. In these states and many others, the focus now is not on developing nuclear weapons but on expanding international markets, breaking down trade barriers and establishing trading partnerships. The world's security interest is clearly served by these trends. Let me now turn to describing the efforts the international community is taking to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Many in the international community have worked for a nuclear test ban since the 1950s. In 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom reached agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, outlawing nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. India and Pakistan are parties to that Treaty However, despite the efforts made during the 30 years that followed, a CTBT--banning all nuclear explosions, including those conducted underground--proved elusive. Only in January 1994 did CTBT negotiations begin in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the international community's principal forum for the negotiation of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. The five declared Nuclear Weapon States (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China), the three so-called threshold states (India, Pakistan and Israel) and dozens of other states participated in these negotiations, which concluded in August of 1996. However, when the final treaty text emerged in the CD, India complained that the Entry into Force provision violated its sovereignty and criticized the fact that there was no timebound commitment to nuclear disarmament. Since the CD decides by consensus, India's objections prevented the recommendation of the treaty to the United Nations as a CD-approved document. Australia resolved this problem by leading a creative diplomatic initiative. With the support of virtually all other CD states, Australia took the unusual step of "bypassing" the CD and introduced a resolution directly in the United Nations General Assembly calling for adoption of the treaty as negotiated in the CD. On 10 September 1996 this resolution, as noted above, was passed by an overwhelming vote. As of early June 1997, 144 nations had signed the CTBT, including all five of the declared Nuclear Weapon States and Israel. India has so far refused to sign and Pakistan has stated that it will not sign until India does and until it has assessed how signing the Treaty will affect its security. India's Positions on the CTBT India has argued against the CTBT on four counts. First, India sought a commitment from the Nuclear Weapon States to negotiate nuclear disarmament within a timebound framework as a condition of its support for a CTBT. Second, India argued that the CTBT would not contribute to nuclear disarmament because it banned nuclear explosive testing, but not other activities related to nuclear weapons, such as subcritical (non-nuclear explosive) experiments or computer simulations. Third, India asserted it would not sign the CTBT because it wanted to maintain its strategic flexibility. During the CTBT debate, Ambassador Prakesh Shah, India's permanent representative to the United Nations, stated that India "cannot permit our option to be constrained as long as countries around us continue their weapon programmes either openly or in a clandestine manner" and as long as "Nuclear Weapon States remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals."(7) Finally; India objected to the CTBT's provision for Entry into Force. This provision, which requires the signature and ratification of 44 states (those listed by the International Atomic Energy Agency as having research or power reactors and that were also CD members as of 18 June 1996), was crafted to ensure that all states with the relevant nuclear capabilities would be committed before Entry into Force. If the Treaty still has not entered into force three years after being opened for signature, a special conference of states that have ratified the treaty can be convened on an annual basis to consider measures to expedite Entry into Force. New Delhi argued that the Entry into Force provision was a breach of Indian sovereignty, as it enforced obligations on India without its consent. In fact, the CTBT posed no breach of a state's right to make its own decisions--no state can be forced to sign. No one denies that each state has the sovereign right to choose whether or not to sign or ratify this treaty or any other treaty. Such an Entry into Force requirement is also not new. In the 1960s, both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty required that certain states, identified as original parties" and "depositaries" respectively; ratify before the treaties could enter into force. More recently; the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty required the ratification of ail 22 states named in the treaty's preamble who were identified as "States Parties" to the treaty. None of the other 43 states whose ratification is required for Entry into Force of the CTBT has argued that the clause is a breach of its sovereignty. India also asserted that the conference would permit sanctions against India. To this day; New Delhi remains concerned despite assurances from the chairman of the CD's CTBT negotiating committee, who publicly stated that the review conference would not have the power to impose sanctions. The CTBT's Contribution to Nuclear Disarmament The CTBT is a key step that the nuclear weapons states, including China, are taking to meet their obligation to work toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.(8) In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton noted that the CTBT "will help to prevent the nuclear powers from developing more advanced and more dangerous weapons.... It points us toward a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced and ultimately eliminated."(9) It is worth exploring why this is the case. In Article I, each party to the CTBT undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere and for all time. Absent the CTBT, continued explosive testing could have demonstrated new developments and the utility of new nuclear weapons designs. These developments might have involved nuclear "directed energy" weapons such as the nuclear-explosion-pumped X-ray laser and the so-called nuclear shotgun that would have focused the release of energy with greater precision than is now possible. Continued testing may have also involved enhanced electro-magnetic pulse weapons and microwave weapons. The true zero-yield CTBT will preclude the development of these technologies and also new "mini"-and "micro"-nukes--weapons designed to produce very low nuclear explosive yields. So for the Nuclear Weapon States, the CTBT will rule out new qualitative advances in nuclear weaponry. A "no nuclear testing" regime will mean much lower confidence in any new weapon design they might seek to pursue, making the attempt to do so very risky. For prudent military planners, new types of nuclear weapons will be out of the question, given the real uncertainties they would confront without the ability to conduct nuclear explosive tests. In short, under the CTBT the "vertical proliferation" associated with the pursuit by the five nuclear states of new and advanced nuclear weapons should end and the current generation of nuclear weapons should be the last. As such, the CTBT will help foster an international political environment conducive to further reductions in nuclear arsenals and move us toward the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These disarmament contributions of the CTBT have been widely noted. China's ambassador to the CD, for example, observed that the CTBT "will surely facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, thereby enhancing international peace and security."(10) Non-aligned states have similarly praised the CTBT. Sri Lanka's Permanent Representative to the United Nations noted his country's "sincere hope that (the CTBT's) conclusion ... will prove to be a landmark event in our steadfast efforts to realize the long and cherished goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.(11) South Africa called the CTBT "an essential instrument for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation ... (which will achieve) the end of nuclear test explosions and the inhibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally."(12) The CTBT should also facilitate further reductions in nuclear forces--the most direct contribution to the nuclear disarmament agenda that the declared Nuclear Weapon States can make. It will sustain and give impetus to continued bilateral reductions between the United States and Russia. The CTBT will largely eliminate concerns that one of the other Nuclear Weapon States may develop advanced new types of nuclear weapons, and thus will build confidence for further negotiations. In the sphere of nuclear disarmament, an important way to impose additional and durable constraints on nuclear weapon programs is to ensure that the CTBT is ratified and brought into force as rapidly as possible. Without the CTBT, those constraints are not formally codified into international law. Without the CTBT, the declared Nuclear Weapon States contemplating nuclear weapon reductions will lack the assurances of the International Monitoring System and all the deterrent and detection possibilities of on-site inspections to help confirm that no other state is enhancing or assembling a nuclear arsenal through nuclear explosive tests. Without the CTBT, all nations will be denied the benefits of a rigorous verification regime, including the ability to investigate thoroughly suspicions of further nuclear testing. Without the CTBT, the nuclear arsenals that the world community, including India, seeks to reduce and eventually eliminate, could grow and be developed in ever more dangerous ways. In this regard, it would appear to be in India's interest to constrain the nuclear capabilities of both Pakistan and China. States that have signed the CTBT certainly remain hopeful that India will rethink its approach to the Treaty and support practical international efforts toward nuclear disarmament. For their part, Indian policymakers will need to ask themselves whether their country and the world are better off without the CTBT than they would be with the very real constraints on nuclear weapon programs that the Treaty imposes. Many states, including many of India's closest trading partners in the Pacific Rim, asked themselves this question and all concluded that they are better off with the CTBT. For example, Indonesia commented that while it perceives flaws in the treaty, "the international community can not dispense with a CTBT despite its imperfections because failure to seize an existing opportunity would have led to negative implications for disarmament and we would have run the risk of delaying action into an uncertain future." Indonesia further stated that it "hoped that (the CTBT) will eventually be supported by the entire (CD) membership so that it will become an effective instrument to move towards the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons."(13) Expressing a similar sentiment, Malaysia's ambassador to the United Nations stated that "Malaysia ... will sign the Treaty out of the realization that an imperfect Treaty is better than no treaty.... The challenge before the international community, pending the Entry into Force of the Treaty, is in ensuring that the current moratoria on nuclear testing are being observed, while exerting every effort to secure the universal endorsement of the Treaty."(14) Internal Debate in India The CTBT negotiations stimulated an extensive public debate about India's security policy. While polls indicate that many of India's political elite currently believe India should retain some sort of nuclear "option" as long as other countries do, there does not seem to be much support for making changes to the current policy. Only a small, but vocal contingent has called for the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. Others, such as Raja Ramanna, physicist and former chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, argue that India can maintain its security without testing.(15) Another group argues that not signing the CTBT was a mistake. The outcome of this debate will obviously be influenced by many internal factors including public perceptions, political developments and an assessment of India's economic and security concerns. Seeing where the United States and Russia now stand--at the other end of a costly and dangerous nuclear arms race--and having just begun the expensive and extraordinarily complex clean-up process associated with ending that race, the international community wonders what India could stand to gain by conducting another nuclear test or deploying nuclear weapons. Certainly, such steps would alter India's relations with China and Pakistan for the worse. China might take steps to counter these developments--steps that India would likely be hard-pressed to match given China's overall capabilities. Pakistan could well follow suit with similar actions of its own, thereby exacerbating existing Indo-Pakistani tensions and possibly touching off a spiraling arms race that would tax the economic systems of both countries. Rather than focus on economic growth and societal reform, India would need to turn its attention to countering the increased military threat from two nuclear neighbors. Likewise, if India were to exercise a nuclear option, its neighbors in ASEAN, who are actively pursuing the completion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, might rethink their approach to India. India's efforts to expand its relations in Asia could well be frustrated by its development of nuclear weapons. Finally, will foreign investors continue to consider India if they can invest their money in other potential economic power houses that do not suffer from the regional tensions characteristic of South Asia, tensions that would be enormously exacerbated by a regional nuclear arms race? With the growth of other economic markets in Asia, the answer may well be negative. Nuclear Disarmament Accomplishments In a memorable speech to the U.N. General Assembly in June 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi called for a 50 percent cut in Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals; a halt in production of weapons grade fissile material; a moratorium on nuclear testing "to set the stage for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty," and the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 20 ! 0. He further called for all non-Nuclear Weapon States not to cross the nuclear weapon threshold. Although he urged the world to achieve nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame, the prime minister also acknowledged the need for all states to pursue specific steps toward nuclear disarmament.(16) Many of the steps Mr. Gandhi proposed, including conclusion of a CTBT and deep cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals, have now been achieved. In addition, four of the Nuclear Weapon States have declared that they are no longer producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and, in 1995, a mandate for negotiating a treaty to cut-off the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons was agreed to in the CD. We are hopeful that negotiations on a cut-off treaty, which will oblige all the declared Nuclear Weapon States never again to produce fissile material for use in nuclear explosive devices, will begin soon. In addition, the United States and Russia have eliminated over 2,500 intermediate-range missiles, thus taking an entire class of nuclear weapons systems out of commission. Both countries also decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands of tactical nuclear arms; agreed not to target each other with nuclear weapons; and agreed in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I (START I) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II (START II) to reduce their strategic nuclear forces by more than 17,000 warheads. START I reductions by both Washington and Moscow are running two years ahead of schedule.(17) The United States has also taken other unilateral steps to support disarmament and ensure that nuclear weapons now have a much smaller strategic role. Today, there are no nuclear weapons in the custody of U.S. ground forces and naval tactical nuclear forces are no longer deployed at sea. Furthermore, the United States is dismantling about 1,300 nuclear warheads a year--the fastest practical rate, given technical and safety constraints. Since 1988, the total active weapons stockpile has been reduced by nearly three-fifths; strategic warheads by almost half; and non-strategic warheads by 90 percent. Finally, President Clinton announced on 1 March 1995, that 200 tons of fissile material would be permanently withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear stockpile and would never again be used to build a nuclear weapon. Other Nuclear Weapon States are also reducing their nuclear arsenals. France is in the process of eliminating its land-based nuclear missiles and by the end of 1998, the United Kingdom will have only one nuclear weapons system with nearly 60 percent less explosive power than its arsenal of the 1970s.(18) Moreover, China has signed the CTBT and supports international efforts to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Additional states have also contributed directly to nuclear disarmament. In 1991, South Africa relinquished its nuclear weapon program. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to become non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to the NPT in 1994 and joined the START I Treaty By the end of 1996, these states completed the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons from their respective territories. Regional agreements have also flourished. Argentina and Brazil have signed a bilateral safeguards agreement and accepted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards while nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements have been signed or negotiated in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia; and the countries of the Middle East have agreed in principle to such a zone. The Need for a Step-by-Step Process As President Clinton has affirmed, the United States is committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Everyone would like to see this process move faster. But the best way to get there is through individual and persistent steps that both de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and create the international security conditions permitting additional strides toward nuclear disarmament. Requiring the elimination of nuclear weapons by a certain date, as India has proposed, simply is not effective. Real gains in arms control and disarmament depend not on what is desired or even demanded, but on what is possible as a matter of security. Progress is greater and faster when countries aim for practical increments rather than great leaps. In this way, each successful step changes the security environment and so makes subsequent steps more attainable. Conclusion of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for example, paved the way for strategic reductions under START I, which in turn opened the door for START II. The indefinite extension of the NPT, rather than halting further nuclear disarmament steps, as some argued would happen, gave important impetus to international efforts to conclude the CTBT. The CTBT, in turn, should make subsequent steps easier to achieve. While a definite time frame might seem attractive, the best bet is working to conclude the steps that are possible now and to identify early on the steps that can follow and begin planning for them. Thus, all states must foster a regional and international security environment in which nuclear disarmament can be pursued. Nuclear disarmament cannot occur on demand or in a vacuum, but must take place in the context of broader improvements in the international security environment. That process does not preclude, but rather mandates careful, continuing attention to further steps. Further Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament When the CTBT and START II treaties enter into force and the fissile material cutoff treaty negotiations get underway and eventually are completed, legitimate questions will emerge about follow-on steps. How can the United States and Russia ensure that the other three declared Nuclear Weapon States eventually become participants in the nuclear weapons reduction and elimination process? How can international and regional security be further strengthened? It is because of these questions that all states must meet the challenge to maintain the momentum in the years ahead. Obviously, for now the bulk of the work needs to be done bilaterally--by the United States and Russia--for it is these two countries that have the largest arsenals. If these countries are to succeed, however, all states must take steps to resolve permanently the factors that drove the U.S.-Soviet arms race originally and that have driven rivalries in regions such as South Asia for the past 20 years. These steps include, but are by no means limited to, finding ways to reduce further reliance on nuclear weapons and pursuing bilateral, regional and global dialogues and agreements designed to reduce tensions and address security concerns. The Way Ahead If the world is to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, all countries must consider what their next steps will be. The Canberra Commission, Stimson Center and Atlantic Council reports, as well as recent statements of the former head of the Strategic Air Command, General Lee Butler, and other former military leaders reflect careful and considered thinking on this question. When General Butler calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons, he challenges us all to find ways to keep the disarmament process moving forward.(19) Now that the United States has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (a step India has already taken), the U.S. priorities are to ratify the CTBT, conclude a global fissile material production cut-off treaty, find ways to work with Russia to bring START II into force and then begin negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks III (START III) to reduce further U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. President Clinton has confirmed the American commitment to engage Russia in further cuts once START II has been ratified.(20) At the March 1997 summit, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin reached an understanding to begin negotiations on START III immediately following the Entry into Force of START II. The United States and Russia also reached an understanding that START III will establish--by 31 December 2007--a ceiling of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each of the parties. This number represents a 30 to 45 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II. Finally, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that START III will be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures related to the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.(21) Conclusion The end of the Cold War has enabled welcome reductions in nuclear forces and a sharply diminished security role for nuclear weapons. Recent nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements have both symbolized and embodied the widespread recognition that the military and political utility of nuclear weapons is shrinking. The world understands that the political, economic and environmental costs of continuing to develop and test nuclear weapons today far exceed the benefits. While we still have a long way to go, a consensus has been reached that the trend toward an ever smaller role for nuclear weapons should be reinforced and that work toward their ultimate elimination should be continued. India, along with many other nations, co-sponsored the resolutions for the CTBT and fissile material cutoff agreements in the United Nations in December of 1993. Moreover, when Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Washington in May 1994, he and President Clinton "offered their strong support for efforts towards the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and toward their progressive reduction, with the goal of elimination of such weapons" and termed this goal "among the most pressing challenges to the security of states in the post-Cold War era."(22) This year, India celebrates the 50th anniversary of its independence. Perhaps this occasion will provide the necessary opportunity for renewed efforts to identify areas of common ground and to move the process of peace, stability and disarmament forward. (1) Statement by Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha (New Delhi: 2 April 1954). (2) 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, NPT/CONE1995/L.5 (9 May 1995). (3) The two countries have signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoiding airspace violations, notification of military exercises and a senior military level hotline. In 1991, India and Pakistan ratified an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and since 1992 have exchanged lists of covered facilities. India and Pakistan have also declared a regional ban on chemical weapons and are working on a similar statement concerning biological weapons. Accusations by both sides that the other has violated many of these agreements may now actually be adding to regional tension. (4) Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. (5) James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink, American and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989) and The Henry L. Stimson Center, An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture, Report 19, unpublished paper (Washington, DC: December 1985) p. 6. (6) The distance between Islamabad and New Delhi is 500 miles. (7) Statement by Prakesh Shah, 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 9 September 1996) p. 5. (8) Article VI of the NPT states: "Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." (9) Remarks by President Clinton, 51st Sessioo of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 24 September 1996). (10) Statement by H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Resumed Session of the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 9 September 1996). (11) Statement by H.E. Mr. H.L. De Silva, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, Resumed Session of the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (9 September 1996). (12) Statement by H.E. Mr. K.J. Jele, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Resumed Session of the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (9 September 1996). (13) Statement by Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti, Permanent Representative of Indonesia, General Debate in the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 51st Session of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 14 October 1996). (14) Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hasmy Bin Agam, Alternate Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 51st Session of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 14 October 1996). (15) "We've the Ability to Make N-Bombs: Ramanna," Times of India, 28 October 1996. (16) Statement by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi,- U.N. General Assembly (New York: 15 June 1988) U.N. General Assembly Document no. A/S-15/PV. 14. (17) Remarks by John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.N. General Assembly First Committee (New York: 16 October 1996). (18) See Giovanni de Briganti, "France Continues to Pare Down Nuclear Forces," Defense News, 14-20 October 1996 and United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, "Statement on the Defense Estimates 1996," unpublished paper (London: 1996) paragraph 154. (19) Statement by General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Retired), National Press Club (Washington, DC: 4 December 1996). (20) Remarks by President Clinton, 51st Session of the U.N. General Assembly (New York: 24 September 1996). (21) White House, Office of the Press Secretary Sheet, "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces," (Helsinki: 21 March 1997). (22) Joint Statement between Prime Minister Rao and President Clinton, White House (Washington, DC: 19 May 1994). John D. Holum was appointed director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by President Clinton in 1993. He serves as the principal advisor to the President and Secretary of State on matters of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Mr. Holum previously worked as an attorney at O'Melveny &Myers and advised the 1992 Clinton campaign on foreign policy and national security. He also served on the policy planning staff of the U.S. State Department during President Carter's administration and the foreign relations staff of Senator George McGovern.
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