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The Tibet Issue in Post-Summit Sino-American Relations.
by Barry Sautman Introduction At the end of a press conference held by Presidents Clinton and Jiang during their 1998 Beijing summit, Jiang asked for an extra five minutes to discuss Tibet and stated, "[A]s long as the Dalai Lama can publicly make a statement and a commitment that Tibet is an inalienable part of China and that he must [sic] also recognize Taiwan as a province of China, then the door to dialogue and negotiation is open."(1) These brief remarks surprised U.S. officials. Jiang had breached a taboo by broaching the Tibet Question with a foreigner - and live on PRC national television. His statement has since provided a basis for U.S. officials to press the Tibet issue with PRC leaders. It also caused a sensation among Tibetans in Beijing and Tibet, who began to speak more optimistically about the possibility of a breakthrough in the dispute between the PRC and the Tibetan exile administration in Dharamsala, India.(2) Jiang Zemin had said nothing new. The tone and setting of his remarks, however, markedly departed from recent practice. Just a day earlier, Ye Xiaowen, China's top official in charge of religion, had attacked the Dalai Lama as a duplicitous apostate bent on restoring feudalism in Tibet and had criticized U.S. officials as irresponsible for raising the Tibet Question. In contrast, Jiang did not denounce the Dalai Lama and directly responded to President Clinton's raising of the Tibet issue. Jiang did not require the Dalai Lama to state that Tibet had been part of China since the thirteenth century, as the PRC asserts. Observers, including the Dalai Lama's representatives, viewed Jiang's remarks as "startling" and a sign of "positive movement in Beijing," attributable in part to U.S. efforts. Rumors quickly surfaced that the exiles would send a delegation to China to set the stage for negotiations.(3) This paper examines U.S. interest in the Tibet Question and the Chinese response. Official U.S. involvement reflects a popular American interest in Tibet's religion and culture that has become politicized through exile efforts to internationalize the Tibet Question. Domestic pressures emanating from this single-issue constituency and antagonism toward the last major Communist state have produced one-sided U.S. support for the Tibetan exile cause, despite the Dalai Lama's vacillation on whether to seek independence or greater autonomy for Tibet. The PRC response to U.S. interest in the issue has been concomitantly hostile. There are, however, recent indications of changes on both sides. With Sino-American relations now central to U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. has begun to shift to a more balanced stance, which is also a precondition for it having any role in facilitating negotiations on the Tibet Question. China also seems to have opened a window of opportunity for third parties to participate indirectly in forging a compromise solution to the Tibet Question. The Tibet Question in the United States A "Tibet fever," spurred by films, appeared in the U.S. in the late 1990s. "Seven Years in Tibet," starting Brad Pitt, depicts the friendship of a very young Dalai Lama and an Austrian Nazi mountain climber who became the boy's tutor. The film's adviser was Tenzin Tethong, long the Dalai Lama's representative in international fora and ex-head of the exile Kashag (cabinet). "Kundun," by U.S. director Martin Scorcese, is an authorized biography of the young Dalai Lama; screenplay writer Melissa Mathison met several times with the Dalai Lama to receive his advice. These films portray the PRC government as villainous and are seen by it as separatist propaganda. U.S. studios, however, have scheduled five more films about Tibet, so the Tibet Question will literally be before the public eye well into the next century.(4) The films are emblematic of growing U.S. popular support for Buddhism and the Dalai Lama's cause. Internationally, Buddhist leaders bemoan the waning of faith of a quarter billion followers; in the U.S., Buddhism is the fastest growing religion, with 500,000 U.S.-born converts and 1.5 million Asian Buddhist immigrants. In 1989-97, Buddhist teaching centers in the U.S. more than doubled from 429 to 1,062. Many converts follow Tibetan Buddhism, among them film, music and fashion stars. Huge "Concerts for a Free Tibet" were staged in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Leading fashion designers contribute creations to fund-raising for Tibetan exile causes. A cottage industry of popular books on Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism has emerged.(5) The leap of interest in all things Tibetan has had a political effect. Membership in the International Campaign for Tibet, the main organization coordinating support for the Dalai Lama's program,jumped from 2,000 in early 1997 to 25,000 in mid-1998. Its website went from 500 to 60,000 hits a week during the peak run of "Seven Years in Tibet." Students for a Free Tibet grew from a dozen chapters in 1993 to 400 in 1997. The Committee of 100 for Tibet now assembles Nobel Prize winners and notables from across the political spectrum. Demonstrations demanding that China withdraw from Tibet are prominently covered in the U.S. media. Pro-exile polemicists have a lockhold on discussion of the Tibet Question in key U.S. newspapers.(6) Effective lobbying has allowed the Dalai Lama's supporters to gain the ears of many public figures. During his first twenty years in exile (1959-79), the Dalai Lama was not allowed to enter the U.S. Now he meets with the U.S. President every year. Scores of members of Congress participate in a Tibet caucus led by Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), chair of the House International Relations Committee, and Jesse Helms (R-NC), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The caucus includes liberals as well, such as Senators Russell Feingold (D-WI) and Daniel Moynihan (D-NY), and is part of a larger group that has produced a blizzard of anti-PRC legislation. Few members avoid this trend. For example, in 1998 the House voted 397-0 to call upon the president to introduce a resolution before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights condemning PRC human rights practices (H Res 364). The Senate passed a similar measure (S Res 187), knowing that the president had concluded that a U.N. resolution had no chance of success and would harm U.S.-China relations. A month later, the Dalai Lama endorsed the president's decision and even stated that China should not be publicly condemned.(7) China's sole responsibility for the Tibet conflict is an article of faith among U.S. politicians. Congressional hearings have no witnesses who diverge from Tibetan exile positions, a situation acknowledged by the head of one such committee. In contrast to the 1980s, when the executive branch at times took issue with Congress's assertions about Tibet, U.S. administrations in the 1990s have seldom objected to even the most fanciful Congressional claims. From 1991, when Congress declared Tibet to be "an occupied country," it has passed resolutions that demand that the U.S. establish diplomatic ties with the Tibetan government-in-exile. After a three-year effort, U.S. lawmakers succeeded in 1997 in forcing the appointment of a special coordinator for Tibet whose duties include liaising with Dharamsala. Congress supports the uniformly pro-Dalai Lama broadcasts of Voice of America and Radio Free Asia provides scholarships to bring Tibetans vetted by the exile administration to U.S. universities, and gives $2 million a year to exile projects.(8) As one U.S. official has noted, "Tibet is an issue of rising salience and prominent visibility on the [U.S.-China] agenda." U.S. Secretary of State Albright had lengthy discussions on Tibet with PRC leaders in 1998. Just before his trip to China, Clinton described the Tibet Question as "a big thing" for the U.S. and promised to seek "autonomy with integrity" for Tibet. The rise to prominence of Tibet as a question in U.S.-China relations contrasts with the earlier on-again-off-again nature of the issue. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, the U.S. trained and armed Tibetan rebels. From the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, Tibet largely faded from the U.S. agenda during a period of U.S.-China quasi-alliance against the former USSR. By the mid-1980s, however, U.S.-China amity had begun to erode with Congress's excoriation of China on issues such as abortion, arms proliferation and the trade balance. Tibetan exile hopes that China would negotiate independence were dashed, but at the same time loosened controls over religion in Tibet and travel to the region gave nationalist monks and nuns and exiles more opportunity for political organization.(9) Tibetan exiles and Western supporters devised a strategy to boost separatism in Tibet by showing that it had worldwide support. The strategy involved encouraging civil disobedience in Tibet and a stepped-up travel schedule for the Dalai Lama, who would seek talks with China on "reasonable" terms and build support/lobby groups and parliamentary Tibet caucuses. Internationalization coincided with increased interest in developed countries in human rights in the developing world. With the fall of communism in Europe, the Dalai Lama became convinced that China was the next domino to fall.(10) Fierce repression against protests in Tibet in the late 1980s boosted internationalization. "Tibet Fever" is thus not only the culmination of Western interest in Buddhism and Tibetan culture, but also a fruit of the internationalization strategy. The Intractable Tibet Question The Tibet Question is a difficult issue in U.S.-China relations because it is one of the world's most intractable conflicts. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is a long-running ethnic dispute that has persisted into the post-Cold War era of rising nationalism. Neither China's rulers nor the Tibetan exiles have escaped the nationalist trend. Under the most favorable circumstances, ethnic conflicts are hard to resolve because they are subject to "ethnic outbidding" in which leaders seek to steal a march on rivals through nationalist one-upmanship. Outbidding escalated the post-communist world's ethnic conflicts and makes it difficult for ethnic leaders locked in potentially secessionist conflicts to advance compromise proposals.(11) Second, the Tibet Question has religious overtones that draw in seekers of religious merit through struggle. Some 70 percent of those imprisoned in Tibet for separatism are monks and nuns. Disputes continue about the permissible number of monks (now 2 percent of the Tibet population), the control of lamasery management, and whether the Dalai Lama or the PRC had the right in 1995 to recognize the reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhism's second highest figure, the Panchen Lama. The religious and ethnic aspects of the conflict overlap because chauvinistic Han Chinese regard traditional Tibetan culture as "primitive."(12) Third, the Tibet Question is a sovereignty dispute. Despite the historical ambiguities of the Sino-Tibetan relationship, each side claims the exclusive right to rule the ethnic Tibetan areas. The exiles assert that Tibetans are a nationality wholly apart from the Chinese, that Tibet is only part of China "because of the use of force by the Chinese communists, not because of history," as the Dalai Lama puts it, and has a right to independence supported by international law. The PRC argues that Tibetans are part of the Chinese people (zhonghua minzu), that Tibet has been linked to China since the Tang Dynasty (618-906) and has been part of the country from the Yuan Dynasty (1234-1368). China points out that international law does not sanction secession.(13) For internal political reasons, neither side has openly considered trading away any "ownership" rights that it claims. The exiles have stated a willingness to cede to the PRC only the rights to represent Tibet in the U.N. and temporarily station troops on Tibet's borders, although the Dalai Lama has indicated that he may be willing to leave "law and order" functions to the PRC. The only PRC "concessions" offered are the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet and a sinecure as one of sixteen PRC National People's Congress vicechairmen. The parties, moreover, do not agree on what is Tibet. China limits it to the area controlled by the Dalai Lama prior to 1950 ("political Tibet," where 45 percent of all ethnic Tibetans live). The exiles argue that Tibet includes all areas in which ethnic Tibetans once formed a majority ("ethnographic Tibet"), including places that now have few Tibetans. They seek, moreover, to have any agreement with China guaranteed by India and have upheld India's acquisition of nuclear weapons to prod India to play an "influential role" in a settlement.(14) Fourth, the Chinese government fears that concessions offered to the Tibetan exiles will create opportunities for separatists in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The Dalai Lama's camp gives the PRC no peace of mind on that score. It participates in an Allied Committee of Uygur, Mongol and Manchu separatists whose aim is to alienate the bulk of PRC territory. The Dalai Lama's 1997 visit to Taiwan was warmly welcomed by Taiwan independence groups and Jiang Zemin has made the Dalai Lama's abstinence from visits to Taiwan a precondition to negotiations. Despite evidence to the contrary, moreover, Tibetan exiles charge that China commits genocide and plunders natural resources. The Dalai Lama terms the mainly ethnic Tibetan leadership in Tibet "local authorities [who] are very narrow-minded, very ignorant and ruthless." Officials in Tibet respond in kind, calling the Dalai Lama an "arch-criminal" and "faithful tool of the international anti-China forces." Both sides find it difficult to conceive of working together in Tibet and each envisages the surrender of the other. Thus, the Dalai Lama has spoken of "the withdrawal of the Chinese regime" following negotiations, while the PRC, in an approach harking back to imperial policies, offers the Dalai Lama titles and emoluments, but no power.(15) Tibet as a Refractory Issue in U.S.-China Relations The Tibet Question has been a hard nut to crack in U.S.-China relations. In contrast to its approach to Taiwan, the PRC has rejected foreign involvement in solving the Tibet problem. When it first began to negotiate with Taiwan's leaders, the PRC made use of Japanese intermediaries. It publicized the positive attitude of Japanese officials toward the PRC's Nine-Point reunification proposal of 1981 and invited pro-Taiwan Japanese politicians to the mainland for talks. More recently, Beijing has sought help from Singapore and the U.S. in persuading Taiwan's leaders to deepen negotiations.(16) China thus does not entirely rule out foreign participation in advancing talks over territorial issues. Why then has it spurned third party efforts regarding Tibet? One reason lies with the PRC exercise of power in Tibet, but not in Taiwan. Taiwan has to be wooed, regardless of how onerous that is for PRC leaders. Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui spurns the "one country, two systems" idea and demands "one China, two sovereign entities," an approach unacceptable to the PRC. He conditions reunification on the adoption of liberal democracy in the mainland and a rise in its living standards to those of Taiwan. Lee refuses direct air and sea links and seeks to curb Taiwan investments in the mainland. Forces that stress a distinct Taiwan identity are increasingly popular and may win the Taiwan presidency in 2000.(17) The PRC thus has scant leverage over its errant province. The U.S., however, is Taiwan's only major ally. Its Congress will not pressure Taiwan, but PRC leaders believe that something may be gained by asking the U.S. executive branch to do so. In contrast, the PRC has great leverage in Tibet. While the exiles in the mid-to-late 1990s capitalized on earlier gains in the West from internationalization, visible separatism in Tibet abated. There were "riots" in Lhasa during the first half-dozen years of internationalization, but no major demonstrations since 1993. Repression, political persuasion, acculturation and social mobility contributed to the remission of separatist activity. The Dalai Lama estimates that he has twenty more active years. Many PRC officials argue that economic and cultural change in Tibet will ameliorate separatism and that the Dalai Lama's passing will end the Tibet Question. Some pro-Dalai Lama figures agree: Lord Ennals, late head of the Tibet Society in Britain, remarked that "without the Dalai Lama, it would be very difficult for the pro-Tibet organizations to keep going."(18) PRC leaders believe time to be on their side with regard to Tibet, while the opposite is true about Taiwan. China has thus been less inclined to seek the aid of foreigners on the Tibet Question. PRC unwillingness to accept the existence of a Tibet Question with international implications has also stemmed from its leaders having carried over a distinction between Tibet and Taiwan first made in the early 1980s. Tibet, they have said, has been "liberated," while Taiwan has yet to be. The Dalai Lama's proposal that a "one country, two systems" solution be applied to Tibet would thus be a social evolutionary step backward, while application of the same concept would be a step forward for Taiwan.(19) PRC social evolutionists have expected that Taiwan, being at a lower stage of political development because of its detachment from the motherland, would be politically involved with foreign states. They have deemed it unnatural for Tibet, as a region at the higher "historical stage" of attachment to the motherland, to have foreigners play a role in determining its political future. U.S. Reluctance to Play a Role While the Taiwan issue was formalized in three U.S.-PRC communiques of the 1970s and early 1980s that prescribe how the U.S. is to interact with Taiwan, the PRC has not acknowledged a Tibet Question in U.S.-China relations. Even had the PRC done so, conflicts over other issues after 1989 precluded it from regarding foreign states as levers for realizing negotiations over Tibet. This has been especially true as to the U.S., which officially recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, but has been a bulwark of the Tibetan exiles. At the same time, because of the "Tibet Lobby," the U.S. has been reluctant to play a role in the prenegotiations process. Officially, it feigns ignorance as to why no negotiations have taken place and leaves it to the parties to solve their problems. Meanwhile, the U.S. has facilitated negotiations over a number of longstanding ethnic conflicts, including Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Palestine. The U.S. role in Northern Ireland is instructive. Until recently Britain complained that pro-Irish nationalist U.S. interventions, made in response to the Irish-American Lobby, interfered in U.K. internal affairs. As a U.K. newspaper observed about the crucial role that was to be played by the U.S. in the Northern Ireland peace process, "the real transformation was when Washington grasped that there were two sides to the Ulster argument" and began to give equal treatment to the Ulster Unionists. Britain could then recognize that the U.S. had "assumed the mantle of honest broker."(20) While the U.S. has facilitated peace accords in and around Europe, it has been more circumspect about taking on disputes in Asia, where U.S. interests seem more attenuated. Changes in the political balance, however, can alter U.S. willingness to become involved. In 1997, Secretary Albright ruled out U.S. mediation between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute, despite being pressed by longtime ally Pakistan. After the "Hindu nationalist" BJP came to power in India, however, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. stated that, while the U.S. has no wish to volunteer as mediator, it would consider ways to help if asked by India and Pakistan. In the case of Tibet, there are no strategic U.S. interests involved. Senate Asia-Pacific Subcommittee chair, Craig Thomas (R-WY), has stated, however, that concern among Americans about human rights in Tibet is sufficient to generate continuous official interest in the situation there. The senator implicitly acknowledged that Tibet Lobby influence impels the U.S. to adopt a less-than-balanced approach that has inhibited it from playing a greater role in the search for answers to the Tibet Question.(21) The Tibet Lobby and U.S. Policy The U.S. Buddhist community is the base of the Tibet Lobby. U.S. Buddhists are more educated than the average American; many are highly articulate and inclined to political participation. They often bring to the Tibetan exile cause a convert's zeal and are affected by Tibetan exile internal politics. The public mainstream position among exiles is to support negotiations to achieve "genuine autonomy" for Tibet, with independence possible only if China breaks apart or becomes a liberal democracy. The exile administration, however, also includes pro-independence leaders, who are treated as a "loyal opposition." Exile leaders assert that most Tibetans favor independence, although this cannot be verified.(22) In short, the exile administration undercuts its own "moderate" position by representing it as a minority view. The politics that the exile administration presents to the world moreover diverge from the reality of barely concealed support for independence among exile leaders. In the 1988 Strasbourg Proposal, the Dalai Lama stated that "the whole of Tibet... should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law... in association with the People's Republic of China." After he abandoned the Strasbourg Proposal in 1990, the Dalai Lama refused to say whether he was reverting to support for independence. The exile parliament, however, endorsed "complete independence" as the official goal in 1992. Many of the Dalai Lama's subsequent statements indicate that he has not wholly abandoned a pro-independence stance. In the mid-1990s, he stated that "our stand is still for independence," "Tibet is not part of China," "Tibet is independent in cultural, geographical, linguistic and racial terms," "experience shows that independence is the only real answer" and "independence remains our goal."(23) He also put it that "Tibet is not part of China," "the entire international community should speak out in support of Tibet's independence" and "of course we have the right to regain our independence." In the late 1990s, the Dalai Lama speaks of "genuine autonomy," but has also stated that "we Tibetans have every right to independence" and "independence is our historic right." These pronouncements might be interpreted as mere assertions that, although Tibetan independence has been usurped, the exiles are willing under the proper conditions to waive their right to reestablish it.(24) Other actions, however, belie this interpretation. The Dalai Lama has been quoted as telling a Barcelona audience that "he would be willing to renounce in the short-term the cause of Tibetan independence, if Beijing would guarantee the establishment of an autonomous Tibetan government." This approach recalls the statement of the Dalai Lama's younger brother Tenzin Chogyal: "Let us first of all achieve autonomy. Then we can throw out the Chinese!" In 1997, the Dalai Lama received participants on a "March for Tibet's Independence" in New York State. The march was sponsored by the International Tibet Independence Movement (ITIM), an organization led by two Indiana University professors, one of whom is Thubten Jigme Norbu, the Dalai Lama's eldest brother. An internationally publicized ITIM report quotes the Dalai Lama as telling the marchers, "People must talk about independence. That is good. We have the right to ask for independence, but we need to think of our methods to struggle for independence. Only prayers will not get independence, and only slogans will not get independence." The marchers' report added "His Holiness stressed that Tibetans must carefully and systematically construct and implement a method to pursue independence."(25) In 1998, the Dalai Lama visited Tibetan Youth Congress hunger strikers in New Delhi. The TYC seeks "complete independence." Its leaders advocated terrorism in the 1980s and endorse "the use of force" today. As with earlier TYC hunger strikes, the Dalai Lama asked for an end to the fast. On this occasion he added that he is "confused" and cannot suggest an alternative. He also praised the hunger strikers' motivation. Western media appraised his tacit acceptance of the hunger strikers' tactic and motives - one of which is to pressure the Dalai Lama to again endorse "complete independence" as a boost to pro-independence forces.(26) It is unlikely that the Dalai Lama saw it in any other light. The ostensible division between "complete independence" forces and formal advocates of a "middle way" is thus unclear. Not surprisingly, PRC spokesmen contend that "the high degree of autonomy advocated by the Dalai Lama is in essence a two-step strategy for Tibetan independence." Former U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibet Gregory Craig put it diplomatically in stating that the Dalai Lama sends "mixed signals" to the PRC. A leading U.S. "complete independence" supporter recognizes this, observing that many exile leaders "privately support independence but publicly maintain a covenant of silence or send out mixed messages." This ambiguity makes it difficult for the PRC to agree to negotiations. Its longstanding position is that there can be negotiations over all issues other than independence, but only if the Dalai Lama accepts that Tibet is part of China. PRC officials express exasperation that the world, convinced that the Dalai Lama eschews independence, places the onus on China for not holding negotiations.(27) Without an unambiguous exile commitment to the proclaimed goal of "genuine autonomy," the Dalai Lama's U.S. representatives have had no incentive to discourage pro-independence activism among their American supporters. Some representatives hold that international support would erode were the Dalai Lama to renounce independence. They encourage members of Congress who are plus royaliste que le roi in insisting that China grant Tibet independence. The idea of "complete independence" has thus carried the day within U.S. Tibet lobby organizations. Among the many U.S. politicians who want nothing short of a "Free Tibet," a PRC/exile "peace process" involving a new compromise approach would seem otiose. For its part, the executive branch has to consider whether any idea that it takes up may alienate Congress. The former special coordinator has nonetheless indicated that, if it would help pave the way to negotiations, the administration would pressure not only China, but also the exiles.(28) China would have to be pressed to grant concessions and the Dalai Lama would have to break with the extremist forces, as every leader who has ever made a breakthrough to negotiations anywhere in the world has done. It is only recently that steps toward U.S. even-handedness have been taken. That is precisely what is required for a third party to play a bridging role in an ethnic conflict. Norway has offered to mediate the Tibet Question, but has been one of the Dalai Lama's most explicit supporters; for example, in the award of his 1989 Nobel Prize and in sponsoring Tibetan exile radio broadcasts. The PRC rejected Norway's offer.(29) The Role of the U.S. in the Search for Negotiations Recent signs of a change in attitude toward foreign concern may presage a greater pragmatism by PRC leaders in dealing with the Tibet Question. To many exiles, efforts at conciliation are necessarily unavailing because there are no "moderate" Chinese leaders on the question of Tibet. The Dalai Lama, however, has periodically singled out certain Chinese leaders as "moderates," including former CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang and ex-United Front Work Department head Yen Mingfu. He has referred to the "open-mindedness"of Premier Zhu Rongji. Western media have identified other leaders as Tibet Question "moderates."(30) Internal PRC politics and more moderate stances taken by the Dalai Lama have also produced periods of lessened Chinese antagonism toward the exiles. For example, in 1978 the Dalai Lama stated that the welfare of Tibetans should be the main consideration in negotiations, signaling a deemphasis of independence. Deng Xiaoping responded by inviting the Dalai Lama's delegates to visit Tibet. In contrast, the Dalai Lama's references at Strasbourg to Tibet's "right to independence" were seen as an encoded demand for independence. Internal Chinese politics and the attitudes of the Dalai Lama will influence the degree of any new PRC opening on Tibet. In mid-1998 there was more latitude for Chinese to discuss politics than at any time since 1989, a liberalization perhaps connected with Jiang Zemin's defeat of political rivals Chen Xitong and Qiao Shi. There is greater scope now for discussion of even a subject as sensitive as Tibet, assuming an agreement among the discussants that the Dalai Lama must acknowledge that Tibet is an inalienable part of China.(31) The PRC also seems more willing than before to permit Westerners to investigate the human rights situation in Tibet. In February 1908, three American clergymen visited Tibet to enquire into religious freedom, a trip facilitated by the U.S. government. The American chairman of the U.S.China Foundation for Aiding Impoverished Areas in Tibet was received by a large number of high Tibetan regional officials in April. The European Union sent a human rights delegation to Tibet in May. A group of Danish politicians critical of China's human rights records visited Beijing and Tibet in August and found that Tibet and the Dalai Lama are no longer "taboo" topics. Chinese leaders answered their questions "in a remarkably open and frank manner." Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited Tibet in September 1998. In 1998, also, the Beijing journal China's Tibet published a piece by a Chinese American that was expressly devoted to the "Tibetan Issue," whose existence the PRC previously denied.(32) Conclusion Jiang Zemin's June 1998 summit press conference statement about Tibet is one indication of greater PRC receptivity to foreign involvement in the Tibet Question. Another indication is that although the PRC publicly denounced the U.S. Special Coordinator before Jiang's statement, officials in Tibet began soon thereafter to privately praise his efforts. These officials appreciate that the U.S. Administration, in its diplomatic efforts concerning Tibet at least, is more even-handed than in the past. The former Special Coordinator, for example, has concluded that the exile demand for Hong Kong-style autonomy is not realistic. President Clinton stated in Beijing that he could understand why the PRC has made acknowledgement by the Dalai Lama that Tibet is part of China a precondition to negotiations.(33) Whether the U.S. administration still regards itself as too politically constrained to play a constructive role, if called upon to do so, remains to be seen, however. Officials realize the profound effect that a Tibet settlement would have on U.S.-China relations, but perhaps underestimate the degree to which a settlement that returns the Dalai Lama to Tibet would be popular among his supporters, even if it falls short of fully realizing his political goals. Whatever Tibet lobbyists may say about the need for a "Free Tibet," Tibetans would greet with acclaim any settlement that allows the Dalai Lama to return to a more autonomous Tibet. The U.S. could convince the Dalai Lama to break with those exile forces whose actions obstruct the road to negotiations. He is uniquely positioned among world leaders to do so, enjoying as he does a religious-based prestige that insulates him from ethnic outbidding. U.S. pressure would in any case inevitably cut both ways. It can gain cooperation from the Dalai Lama only if the PRC offers concessions that make his compromises politically palatable. The U.S. can thus assist both sides by suggesting an acceptable exchange of concessions. PRC concessions need to address the Dalai Lama's greatest concern, the shifting population balance in Tibet and its effect on the survival of Tibetan culture. The exiles' concessions would involve assurances to the PRC that they would no longer seek to detach Tibet from China.(34) The substantive negotiations that would follow would focus on the scope of autonomy for Tibet, particularly on those aspects most relevant to demographic, religious and cultural issues. "Tibet consciousness" in the U.S. has pushed the Tibet Question to the top of the U.S. agenda of China human rights issues. For the U.S. to reach a stage where it can approach the parties with proposals for compromise, however, conditions still need to be fulfilled by China and the U.S., PRC leaders will first have to conclude that the Tibet Question is not self-liquidating, that it will not simply dissolve with the passage of time - as few, if any, ethnic conflicts have done. The PRC government is increasingly image conscious.(35) It also understands the need to reduce potential areas of political instability during its reform-induced period of social instability. One promising path for the PRC to achieve a respite from the need constantly to defend its record and to reduce its political risk is to "mobilize all forces that can be mobilized" on the diplomatic front to bring about successful negotiations over the Tibet Question. U.S. policy makers will have to grasp the possibilities created by a stabilized leadership in China and by the improvement in U.S.-China relations generated by the summits. Periods of relative domestic political stability in China and periods of relatively amicable relations between the U.S. and China have moved in cycles and the positive phases of the two cycles have not always coincided. If the first years of the new millennium prove to be an era of good feeling between the U.S. and China, they will present an unprecedented opportunity for cooperation in solving the Tibet Question. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, November 1998 1 "We are Building a Friendship... Excerpts from the Clinton-Jiang News Conference," Washington Post (hereafter WP), June 28, 1998, p. A22. 2 "Transcript of June 29 White House Briefing by Kristoff, Bader, Roth, Shirk," U.S. Newswire, June 30, 1998; "China's Tang Reassures U.S. on Weapons," Reuters, July 27, 1998; "Tibet Sees Progress," MSNBC, June 29, 1998; interviews with officials and intellectuals, Beijing and Lhasa, June 28-July 13, 1998. 3 "China Lashes Out at Tibet Critics," United Press International (hereafter UPI), June 26, 1998; "'One Country, Two Systems' Not Applicable to Tibet," Xinhua, June 26, 1998; "US Works for China-Dalai Lama Talks," Associated Press (hereafter AP), July 31, 1998; "Beijing Closer to Tibetan Talks," South China Morning Post (SCMP), August 7, 1998, p. 12. 4 "Trying to Save Tibet," San Francisco Chronicle (hereafter SFC), February 20, 1998, p. 1; "'Kundun': the Scenic Route to Tibet," WP, January 16, 1998, p. B1; "In Two Looks at Tibet, No Sign of ShangriLa," New York Times (hereafter NYT), September 7, 1997, p. 60; "Senior Tibetan Official Criticizes Film Seven Years in Tibet." Xinhua, April 8, 1998; "The Real Tibet," Plain Dealer (Cleveland), January 25, 1998, p. 14. 5 "Asia: Buddhist World Fights Rearguard Action," AAP Newsfeed, April 7, 1998; "Buddhas Booming," Guardian, October 4, 1995, p. 2; "Buddhists See Cup as Half Full," Chicago Sun-Times, January 21, 1995, p. 13. "Buddhism Gains Adherents in West," International Herald Tribune (hereafter IHT), June 26, 1995, p. 1; "Hollywood's Unconvincing Leap of Faith," Guardian, March 27, 1998, p. 4. 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Hrg 105-124, May 13, 1997); interview with Senator Craig Thomas. Washington, March 27, 1998; "Beijing is Backed by Administration on Unrest in Tibet," NYT, October 7, 1987, p. A1; Dalai Lama, "Address... April 23, 1997," FNS, May 13, 1997; "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in 60s, Files Show," LAT, September 15, 1998, p. 1. 9 "Albright to Raise Tibet in China Talks," Reuters, April 26, 1998; "China Balks at Concessions Timed to Clinton's June Trip," LAT, May 1, 1998, p. 1; "Interview of the President with Radio Free Asia," June 24, 1998: Tian Dongdong, "The Tibet Issue in Sino-American Relations: United States Policy-making Since Rapprochement" (Ph.D. digs., Brandeis University, 1995). Xu Guangqiu, "The United States and the Tibet Issue," Asia Survey, vol. 37, no. 11 (1997), pp. 1062-77; Warren Smith, Testimony, Hearing of Senate Finance Committee on U.S.-China Trade Relations, July 9, 1998. 10 Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, rev. ed. (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996); "Everyone Benefits from a Democratic China," Newsday, April 27, 1994, p. 31. 11 Zhao Suisheng, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writings in the 1990s," China Quarterly, no. 152 (December 1997), pp. 725-45; Melvyn Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University. of California Press, 1997), pp. 8488; Lee Metcalf, "Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority, Policy in Estonia, 1988-1993," Nations & Nationalism, vol. 2, no. 2 (1996), pp. 213-34. 12 "Over 3,993 Monks and Nuns Expelled," WTN, May 23, 1998; Information Office, State Council, "New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region," Beijing Review, March 9, 1998, pp. 12-22; Ronald Schwartz, Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997); "That's My Boy," Far Eastern Economic Review (PEER), June 20, 1996, p. 26; "Greek Leader Hopes for Closer Ties with China," Xinhua, July 20, 1998. 13 Karl Rahder, "The Tibetan Claim to Statehood," Issues & Studies, vol. 38, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 9-14; Michael McCorquodale and Nicholas Orosz, Tibet: The Position in International Law (Stuttgart: Edition Hansjorg Mayer, 1994); Warren Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Lin Chao-chen, "Dalai: Muqian yu zhonggong duihua bi fang tai zhongyao" (Dalai: At present dialogue with the Chinese Communists is more important than visiting Taiwan), Zhongguo Shibao (Taipei),July 17, 1998, p. 1; 'Tibet- Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation," Xinhua, September 22, 1992. 14 Dalai Lama, "Lost World of a Living Buddha," George Magazine (December 1997), pp. 98-106; "Five Point Policy Toward the Dalai Lama Made Public," Xinhua, October 1, 1981; Goldstein, Snow Lion, p.71; "Dalai Lama Accuses China of Cultural Genocide," Agence France Presse (AFP), March 10, 1998; "His Holiness the Dalai Lama's View on India's Nuclear Tests," WTN, May 20, 1998. 15 June Dreyer, "Assimilation and Accommodation in China," in Michael Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds, Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge: MIT, 1997), pp. 352-91; "The Allied Committee . . ." WTN, October 19, 1994; "Jiang Lays Out Terms for Dalai Lama Talks," SCMP, September 26, 1998, p. 7; Barbara Erikson, Tibet: Abode of the Cods, Pearl of the Motherland (Berkeley: Pacific View Press, 1997); Dalai Lama Ready to Quit Politics if Tibet Wins Autonomy," AFP, June 9, 1998; "Tibet's Exiled Leader . . ." People, April 6, 1998, pp. 106-09; "Dalai Lama Says Talks with Beijing Only Way to Save Tibet," AFP, June 28, 1998; "Tibetan Official Gives Speech to Conference on Dalai Lama's Criminal Activities," Zhongguo Tongxun She, March 14, 1998; Dalai Lama, "Critical Reflections: Human Rights and the Future of Tibet," Harvard International Review, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 46-49; Lisa Husman, "Territory, Historiography, and the Minorities Question in China" (M.A. thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1993). 16 "Japanese Prime Minister Favors Chinese Communist Party-Kuomintang Talks," Xinhua, October 1, 1981; "Japanese Pro-Taiwan Politician Invited to China," Xinhua, March 8, 1980; "Singapore's Lee Criticizes Taiwan Lee's Diplomacy," Asian Political News, January 12, 1998; "Jiang Looks for Progress and Prestige from Clinton," SCMP, April 9, 1998, p. 8; "Cadres to Step Up Pressure on Taipei," SCMP, May 13, 1998, p. 8; "Taiwan Dreads a Sellout as U.S.-China Talks Near," AWSJ, May 20, 1998, p. 1. 17 Willem Van Kemenade, "China, Hong Kong, Taiwan: Dynamics of a New Empire," Washington Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (1998), pp. 105-20. "Taiwan Ruling Party Brushes Off Opposition Gains," December 3, 1995; Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society (London: Routledge, 1997). 18 "Dalai Lama Is All Smiles over Debate," NYT, June 29, 1998, p. A1; "Captain Moonlight's Notebook," Independent. May 9, 1993, p. 21. 19 Dawa Norbu, "China's Dialogue with the Dalai Lama 197890: Prenegotiation Stage or Dead End," Pacific Affairs, vol. 64, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 357; "Tibetan Leaders Raidi, Gyalcain Norbu at Parliament News Briefing." Xinhua, March 11, 1998. 20 "Prepared Testimony of Jeffrey Bader . . . Senate Foreign Relations Committee," FNS, May 13, 1997; "Prepared Testimony of Ronald Schwartz . . . Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Re the Political Situation in Tibet, September 7, 1995," FNS, September 9, 1995; Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," International Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (1996), pp. 521-36; "Gloating China Says Britain Faces Crisis," Reuters, February 4, 1994; "Irish Peace Talks: Deal Not Possible without Clinton," Independent, April 11, 1998, p. 3. 21 "US Rules Out Mediation on Kashmir," UPI, November 19, 1997; "US Envoy Sees Role for Washington in Reducing Regional Tension," SCMP, April 6, 1998, p. 12; interview with Senator Craig Thomas, March 27, 1998. 22 "Survey Shows Americans a Religious People," UPI, April 3, 1991; Dalai Lama, "Lost World," George Magazine, pp. 98-106; "Dalai Lama Says Autonomy, Not Independence, Is Goal," Reuters, August 12, 1993; Bhuchung Tsering, "Looking at the Tibetan Struggle," in Edward Lazar, ed., Tibet: The Issue Is Independence (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1994), pp. 45-50; Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Tibet: Survival in Question (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 185. 23 "Tibet Political Prisoners Total 'Soars to 335,'" SCMP, May 14, 1993, p. 10. "Dalai Lama Wants China Deal," Guardian, May 13, 1993, p. 12; "Dalai Lama Meets Overseas Chinese in Montreal," Central News Agency, June 23, 1993; "Dalai Lama: China's Attitude More Favorable Now," Jerusalem Post, August 15, 1993, p. 1. 24 "Hurd Could Incur Anger of Peking," Independent, May 13 1994, p. 5; "Berlusconi Meets Dalai Lama Amid Protest," Reuters, June 17, 1994; "Dalai Lama Says Independent Tibet Good for World Peace," Itar-Tass, July 18, 1994. "Breakdown in Sino-Tibetan Negotiations," Tibet Information Network, September 14, 1994; Dalai Lama, "Address to the World Parliamentarians . . . April 23, 1997," FNS, May 13, 1997; "Exiled Monk Draws Legions," Denver Post, June 2, 1997, p. A01; Eva Herzer, "Rule of Law Is Gaining in China," NYT, July 9, 1998, p. A26. 25 "China Warns Spain, France over Dalai Lama Visit," AFP. April 15, 1997; Donnet, "Tibet," p. 188; "Group Marches for a Free Tibet," Seattle Times, April 14, 1998, p. B1; "Marchers' Private Audience with His Holiness The Dalai Lama," WTN, June 3, 1997. 26 Donnet, "Tibet," p. 186; "Tibetan Protestor Dies," Asian Age, April 30 1998; "Tibet and the Internal Dissent," SCMP, April 30, 1998, p. 17; "Dalai Lama Meets Tibetan Hunger Strikers, Calls for Talks with China." AFP, April 2, 1998; "Fading Vision: Words Fail Dalai Lama in Face of Tibetan Militancy," Montreal Gazette, April 13, 1998, p. 8. 27 "China Urges Dalai Lama to Do 'Something Useful' for Tibet," AFP, April 30, 1998; interview, Gregory Craig, March 25, 1998, Washington; Ed Lazar, "Self-Determination the Wrong Emphasis," Tibetan Review, vol. 38. no. 1 (1993), pp. 15-16; "China and Tibetan Exiles Reopen Talks," Reuters, July 22, 1993; "Smiling Globetrotter Winning the PR Battle," SCMP, September 30, 1996, p. 6. 28 "United States Compromise Disappointing," Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1994, p. 1; Testimony of Lodi Gyari, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FNS, May 13, 1997; interview with Gregory Craig, March 25, 1998. 29 "No Way Norway," FEER, July 16, 1998, p. 24. 30 Tashi Rabgey, "Tibetan Deathwatch: Lessons from the Front," Harvard Asia Quarterly (April 1998); "Dalai Lama Hopes for Fresh Dialogue with New Chinese Leadership," AFP, April 15, 1998; "China Throws New Line to Dalai Lama," Guardian, October 2, 1996, p. 11; "China's Future," AsiaWeek, March 7, 1997. p. 18. 31 Dawa Norbu, pp. 353, 356; Geremie Barme, "Spring Clamor and Autumnal Silence: Cultural Control in China," Current History, vol. 97, no. 620 (September, 1998), pp. 257-62. 32 "US Clerics Tour Tibetan Prison, Meet Jailed Nuns," Reuters, February 26, 1998; "Analysis Tibet," Guard/an, April 14, 1998, p. 15; "Subject of Dalai Lama 'No Longer Taboo in China': Danish Politicians," AFP, August 5, 1998; "Robinson Ends Tibet Trip Amid Allegations of Prison Brutality," AFR September 14, 1998; J-Yao Shen, "Tibetan Issue: Lies vs Truth," China's Tibet, vol. 9, no. 2 (1998), pp. 10-15; "Dalai Lama Accused of Insincerity in Request for Negotiations," Xinhua, April 19, 1997. 33 "China Hits Out at US Tibet Official in Albright Delegation," AFP, April 28, 1998; interview with a western social scientist working in Tibet, Lhasa, July 12, 1998; interview with Gregory Craig, March 25, 1998, Washington. 34 "Dalai Lama Says Independent Tibet Good for World Peace," Kyodo, April 26 1998; interview with Western social scientist working in Tibet, July 12, 1998; Barry Sautman, "The Tibet Question: Meeting the Bottom Lines," Problems of Post-Communism (May/June 1997), pp. 15-24. 35 "Tibet on Top of US Human Rights Agenda," SCM, April 24, 1998, p. 8; "Playing to the Gallery," AsiaWeek, September 26, 1997, p. 64; Maura Moynihan, "High Drama," New Republic, July 6, 1998. BARRY SAUTMAN is an Assistant Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
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