Basically, media play a very important role and can minimize the probability of strikes and lockouts. At the same time, in the case of the conflict between labor unions and employers, especially in sports, the interference of media may be undesirable for both parties. This a bit paradoxical situation may be explained by the essence of relations between employers and labor unions in sports, as well as in other spheres. In general, media may fulfill the function of a mediator prior to the conflict between employees and employers. For instance, it can draw the public attention to the needs of employees, sportsmen, and force employers to improve conditions of work or raise wages, etc.
However, as the conflict or strike has started the interference of media may prevent both parties from the fast and effective negotiation because media will inform the mass audience about all details of the negotiation process revealing details of possible agreement that neither party would like to present to the public. For instance, in sports such negotiation often involves the size of wages of sportsmen and media depicting the negotiation process in details will show to the mass audience that sport is just a business, while the interest of the public to sport is maintained due to its presumable difference from business and it is presented as fair competition for the entertainment of the audience. Thus, media can deteriorate the public image of both employees and employers that will decrease their profits.
The dramatic increase in player from European countries may produce a profound impact on the NHLPA’s ability to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. In fact, it is obvious that European players increase competition among the players. At the same time, European players are ready to accept less profitable offers of employees compared to the local players who have a stable place in their teams. As Europeans target to gain their own place in the new team the will naturally agree to worse conditions and their demands are less ambitious compared to local players.
Moreover, increased competition among players will lead to the decrease of the labor costs since a local player can be substituted by a European one. As a result, the NHLPA will be unable to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement effectively because employers can use the potential of European labor market to sign agreement that will meet their interests.
If a minor league owner has a taste for discrimination of non-white players this will produce a direct impact on their wages. It is obvious that the biased attitude of the minor league owner to non-white players may include the belief that these players are worse or that they need less money or, at any rate, the owner may believe that it is possible to employ them paying less money than to white players. In this regard, the wages of Latinos and black players will decrease proportionally to the coefficient of discrimination, 0.2 and 0.18 respectively, therefore the wages of a Latino player will be $16.000 per year, while a black player will gain $16.400 per year. Obviously, the employment of these sportsmen would be profitable to the owner, and the number of Latinos players will be the highest, followed by black, though it depends on the attitude of the owner to the qualification of the players.
Sponsors who discriminate can experience lower profits because their preferences do not always coincide with the preferences of the audience and, therefore, the effectiveness of sponsorship will decrease if sponsors discriminate extremely popular sportsmen, for instance. Also, discrimination is unacceptable in the modern sport which targets at fair play.