Time of War, by F. M. Wilcox, the editor of the church paper. Here he assembled documents around which he wrote a history of the Adventist noncombatant stance. By omitting accounts of heated debate over the position and references to its failure and neglect in some countries, he gave the impression that it was universally accepted. In fact his discussion was almost totally confined to the English-speaking world.

Beginning with World War II, the Adventist noncombatant position became a vehicle for creating close relations with both federal and military authorities in the U. S. Both sides were party to this shift.

In 1939, as war broke out in Europe, the American church again established a program to provide medical training to potential draftees. This time, however, the program was much more sophisticated than during World War I, for it secured the cooperation of the armed forces: called the Medical Cadet Training Program, it was directed and supervised by regular army officers ( Dick, 1974 :20). The official church paper commented: "Refusing to be called conscientious objectors, Seventh-day Adventists desire to be known as conscientious cooperators" (Editorial, 1941). Some 12,000 American Adventists served as noncombatants in medical branches of the services during World War II. Church leaders were especially proud of their military heroes such as Desmond Doss, whose bravery earned him a Congressional Medal of Honor ( Sibley and Jacob, 1952 :86; Schwarz, 1979 :443; Goldstein, 1985 :2).

The Medical Cadet Corps was revived during the Korean War, and conscripted American Adventists again served in large numbers in medical units. The Adventist Church appointed military chaplains, who were paid by the armed forces and had military careers, for the first time. It also assisted some of the would-be chaplains with financial aid during their ministerial training and ordained them immediately on graduation, since this was necessary for their appointment -- a break with the normal Adventist procedure of having clergy wait several years ( Dick, 1976 :42-45).

By this time the Adventist noncombatant position no longer separated them, but encouraged closer relations with government and military leaders. On numerous occasions church leaders equated the 1-A-O noncombatant position with "conscientious cooperation," and, indeed, signs of cooperation with American authorities multiplied. In 1954 the U S. Army established a special camp at Fort Sam Houston in Texas where all noncombatants could receive their basic training. This removed them from regular units where their refusal to bear arms had been a source of confusion. Over half of the men who trained there were Adventists ( Davis, 1970 :222). "It was a program engineered for the needs of conscientious cooperators" ( Knight, 1992 :17).

That same year the U.S. Army Surgeon General contacted the General Conference seeking approval for the Army to ask Adventist draftees to volunteer for a research program designed especially for them which would "contribute significantly to the nation's health and security." Theodore Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference, responded positively:

If any one should recognize a debt of loyalty and service for the many courtesies and considerations received from the Department of Defense, we, as Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of gratitude for these kind considerations ( Flaiz, 1954).

The upshot was the creation of "Project Whitecoat," under which volunteers from among drafted Adventist noncombatant servicemen spent their periods of military service as guinea pigs in biological warfare research for the U.S. Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Thanks to the enthusiastic encouragement of the General Conference, 2,200 Adventists participated in the program between 1955 and 1973 ( Thompson, 1991; interviews). In taking this position, church leaders subordinated a church doctrine, healthful living, to cementing relations with the U.S. military.

Since the draft was continued during the years between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the church continued to urge young men at Adventist schools to take medical training through participating in the Medical Cadet Corps before draft age. The most enthusiastic of these did intensive field training at a roving Camp Desmond T. Doss, which was usually located at Adventist campgrounds. The military staffed this camp and spent large sums setting up a field hospital (interviews).

South Korean Adventists were taught during the Korean War that it was the church's position not to undergo military training with arms -- a position that was reinforced by visiting General Conference officials. Consequently, following the American model, the Adventist college there gave basic medical training to those expecting to be drafted, who then asked the authorities to assign them to medical units or other noncombatant positions where they did not have to bear arms. However, since the South Korean regime failed to issue an order accommodating to the Adventist stance, obtaining noncombatant positions was a matter of chance, and the unlucky ones sometimes found themselves with an unsympathetic commander who refused to respect their religious restrictions. Two of these were executed at the front line during the war when they refused to bear arms, and about 100 other Adventists were sent to prison for as long as seven years during the 1950s and 1960s for failure to obey orders concerning arms or Sabbath activities; many more were beaten or otherwise mistreated. Appeals to President Park were successful in securing the release of some of these men, but this approach never solved the basic problem. Indeed, the prison terms to which Adventists were sentenced lengthened during the 1960s (interviews).

South Korean Adventists had adopted such a firm position because Americans and Koreans had been allies in a war on their turf. Such a degree of tension with the state over military service was unprecedented among Adventists. In many other countries without provision for alternatives to military service, ranging from Franco's Spain to Communist Eastern Europe to Latin America, Adventists would have faced similar difficulties if they had refused to train with arms. In some countries, such as Argentina, the church provided youth with some medical training, again hoping that the possession of

these skills would shape their paths when they were conscripted. However, the main concern of local church leaders was usually the preservation of Sabbath observance rather than the avoidance of training with weapons -- and they often accommodated on this issue also. They frequently concluded that the General Conference did not understand their situation, so that its statements reflected an American situation which could not be applied to them (interviews). In this way they avoided the tension with the state over military service which the Korean Adventists were experiencing.

Given this diversity of practice, it is perhaps surprising that the Quadrennial Session of the General Conference held in 1954, shortly after the Korean War -- which included delegates from around the world -- voted a major statement which not only confirmed the traditional noncombatant position but provided for it to be included in the Church Manual as a fundamental belief throughout the world:

. . .The breaking out of war among men in no way alters the Christian's supreme allegiance and responsibility to God or modifies his obligation to practice his beliefs and put God first.

This partnership with God through Jesus Christ, who came into this world not to destroy men's lives but to save them, causes Seventh-day Adventists to take a noncombatant position, following their divine master in not taking human life, but rendering all possible service to save it. In their accepting the obligations of citizenship, as well as its benefits, their loyalty to government requires them to serve the state in any noncombatant capacity. . .asking only that they may serve in those capacities which do not violate their conscientious convictions (General Conference Session, 1954).

Delegates thus voted to affirm the position adhered to by the U.S. and South Korea, and to ignore the practice in much of the rest of the world.

However, when the next edition of the Church Manual was being readied for printing in 1959, the General Conference Committee voted to omit the above statement from it. Church leaders were becoming more aware of the problems of observing noncombatancy within many portions of the world church, and some felt it would be inhumane to discipline members caught in such a bind -- a likely result of including the position among the fundamental beliefs of the church.

Nevertheless, when the Executive Committee of the General Conference voted a statement intended to inform military officers of the Adventist position as American involvement in Vietnam was increasing, it affirmed once more that "Seventh-day Adventists . . . are noncombatants" ( General Conference Executive Committee, 1963). The Adventist Church's new official position on military service was shaped by conflict among American members over involvement in this war rather than the problems with observing noncombatancy overseas.

As the Medical Cadet Corps had created increasingly stronger ties between American Adventists and the military, many of the former had become militant patriots. They scorned conscientious objectors, who refused to be involved with the military in any manner and opted for alternative service when drafted. The director of the General Conference National Service Organization was quoted by Time in 1950:

We despise the term 'conscientious objector' and we despise the philosophy back of it. . . We are not pacifists, and we believe in force for justice's sake, but a Seventh-day Adventist cannot take a human life ( "Conscientious Cooperators," 1950 :68).

Consequently, when the ideology surrounding the antiwar movement of the late 1960s led to a spurt in the number of Adventists choosing the 1-0 classification (conscientious objector choosing alternate service), this caused dismay in many quarters. However, since evidence for religious belief was essential if individuals were to receive this classification, the Adventist church was obliged to deal with them. The Annual Council of the General Conference voted in 1969 that such Adventists should be told that the historic teaching of the church was noncombatancy (1-A-0), and urged to consider this first; however, if they persisted in pursuing the 1-0 classification, pastors should provide the needed help if the draftee's wish was consistent with his religious experience (National Service Organization, n.d.:29).

When disagreement and debate on the military issue persisted among American Adventists, the General Conference formed a Study Committee on Military Service in 1971. This large committee received and debated many papers, but remained deeply divided (interviews). When Annual Council took up the matter in 1972, it chose to embrace both the militant patriots and the Adventist pacifists, declaring that military service was a matter of individual conscience. Its vehicle in this was the statement on military obligations voted by the General Conference Session in 1954 (quoted above), which it transformed by adding to it a new ending:

This statement is not a rigid position binding church members but gives them guidance, leaving the individual member free to assess the situation for himself.

The document then interpreted this by confirming that, for members in the U.S., the statement was best reflected in the traditional 1-A-0 (noncombatant) classification, but that the church would also facilitate members applying for a 1-0 (conscientious objector) classification. However, it then added:

For those who conscientiously choose the 1-A classification (military service as a combatant), pastoral guidance and counsel should be provided in ministering to their needs since the Church refrains from passing judgment on them ( Annual Council, 1972).

This decision, then, represented a break with the position that had, in 1954, been declared a fundamental belief.

The new flexibility was tested and confirmed in Korea the very next year. It was noted above that young men there had endured beatings, imprisonment, and even death, rather than renege on their commitment to noncombatancy. However, as time passed younger Koreans began to question whether the costs were worth the stand, and increasing numbers of them opted to violate the recommended church policy in the late 1960s. Then, as the military situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, and Korean troops were withdrawn along with American troops, the

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

Park regime panicked and insisted that all conscripts train with arms (which thus removed the noncombatant alternatives previously available to some Adventists), and that such training be included within college curricula.

This demand placed the Adventist college in a dilemma: should it conform to the new policy or reject it and face closure? When Korean leaders contacted the General Conference seeking advice, the latter reversed the position it had advocated in the 1950s, arguing that it was not worth risking serious trouble with the government: training with arms should be a matter of individual conscience. The College consequently conformed to the government's demand that it train students with weapons, and left the choice of whether they would comply to the individual consciences of the students, not urging them one way or the other:

If the College had refused to do the training, the Ministry of Education would have closed it, unless the Lord performed a miracle. . . We decided that the college was more important than noncombatancy (interview).

The result of this decision was that almost every Adventist student and conscript in Korea thereafter trained with weapons. The church's abandonment of its noncombatant position was a wrenching experience for the Koreans who had earlier endured prison, and more than half of them have since exited the church (interviews).

Meanwhile, Adventism in America had backed away from the serious teaching of noncombatancy through Sabbath Schools, youth programming, and the church school system. When the U.S. switched to a volunteer army in 1973, and recruiters began emphasizing educational and vocational benefits that appealed to lower-SES racial minorities, Adventists began to volunteer for military service in unprecedented numbers -- an act which removed the noncombatant option available to draftees. The church now directed its main effort into chaplaincy, and by 1992 the Adventist chaplaincy corps had grown to a total of 44. The National Service Organization, which was originally staffed by pastors and evangelists and whose object was to handle the problems of draftees with noncombatant status and Sabbath observance, was taken over by chaplains socialized into military values, who now tried primarily to serve the spiritual needs of the Adventist volunteer soldiers. Its new focus was confirmed when it was renamed the office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries (interviews).

There is considerable diversity today in how the international Adventist church relates to conscription and military service around the globe. Adventists in most of Western Europe continue to hold the traditional "modified pacifist" noncombatant position. When conscripted, most of them opt for the civil alternative available to them, even though this often means a longer commitment. They frequently expressed shock in interviews at the number of Adventists volunteering for service with arms in America. Those in what was West Germany have reacted against their history, in common with many of their countrymen, and are often especially strongly noncombatant, antiwar, and for disarmament; they wonder about the flow from the U.S. of Adventist military volunteers and chap

lains doing tours of duty through their land. The church in Italy felt so strongly about the issue that it voted to urge denominational leaders to rule that conscripts choosing to bear arms in countries with a legal alternative to service face church discipline (interviews).⁶

In contrast, in most of the countries of Eastern Europe (while under Communism) and of Latin America, and in several countries in Asia, Adventists have abandoned the weapons issue and have limited their focus when it comes to military conscription to attempts to gain Sabbath privileges and, in some instances, alternatives to a pork-based diet. Church leaders fear that any attempt by Adventists to avoid armed service would sharply escalate tensions with governments. Consequently, there was little concern in Communist Eastern Europe for the weapons issue, which Adventists associated with the Adventist Reform Movement and Jehovah's Witnesses, who regularly faced prison for their beliefs. Adventists there typically trained with weapons but attempted the often daunting task of observing the Sabbath and securing an Adventist diet while in the military. These problems were so great in Romania, for example, that many Adventists chose to delay their baptisms until after completing military service so that they would feel less obligation towards Sabbath observance. Civil alternatives to military service became available during the last years of Communist control in most of these countries, and these were typically chosen by Adventists -- but for reasons related to Sabbath observance problems rather than to any conviction concerning training with weapons. The one exception to this among the satellite states in Eastern Europe was East Germany, where a strong aversion to arms rooted in twentieth century German history led Adventists to choose alternate service as soon as it became available in 1967. In the Soviet Union, taking the alternative of being assigned to construction did nothing to ease the difficulties associated with Sabbath observance until Gorbachev's Perestroika improved the situation considerably (interviews).

Adventists in Latin America also refrain from making an issue of military service. Church leaders in Brazil explained that this enables them to avoid conflict with the state and also the stigma and individual penalties that accrue to Jehovah's Witnesses. Students participate in military parades and compete in marksmanship. When a missionary teacher wanted to teach noncombatancy as part of an ethics course in the church college in Argentina, which ceased trying to train students for medical positions in the military three decades ago, he was discouraged from doing so. Church leaders there explained that training with arms did not worry them unduly, for they felt that Argentina would never fight a war. Argentine Adventists were therefore greatly surprised to find themselves fighting, and dying, in the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) War (interviews).

In Asia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea have conscription. ⁷ Adventists made a formal accommodation with the government of Singapore some years ago which granted them Sabbath privileges and the right not to use weapons. In Thailand, most Adventist conscripts are also able to arrange to protect their Sabbath observance, but they train with weapons. Adventists in South Korea and Taiwan also feel they have no option but to bear arms; they also face considerable difficulties over Sabbath observance (interviews).

Although there is no general conscription in the Philippines, there is considerable government pressure on colleges to include military training within their

programs. Mountain View College in the south has been under great pressure to train with weapons. The senior Adventist college, Philippines Union College (PUC), in the north, has avoided these pressures because its program to train medics is recognized. Both colleges are located close to insurgencies. There is controversy because PUC chose to hire armed guards who, at last count, had killed four intruders (interviews).

The most remarkable involvement of Adventists with weapons and military conflict, however, is found among the Karen rebels against the Burmese government, who have declared an independent state of Cawthoolie along the Thai border. Adventists are the third-largest religious group among these Karens, behind Buddhists and Baptists, but they provide much of the military and political leadership. The general who heads the state, Bo (General) Mya, three of his top deputies, and several other leading military figures are Adventists. Since the Adventist churches and schools there cannot be linked to the denominational structure through Burma, they have been linked instead to the Thai structure. A missionary was stationed there for several years until recently, and church leaders in Thailand visit there frequently to nurture, evangelize, collect tithes and pay the salaries of clergy. Several of them reported having been asked to pray with soldiers before battles. Neither they nor leaders from the church's Southeast Asia Union have taken a stance on the military issue -- "We have not made bearing arms an issue at all, have not said they should not be shooting" -- but have kept their role spiritual: "Our hearts are with them, but officially we cannot take sides -- it would jeopardize missionaries elsewhere." They have not had advice from the General Conference or the Far Eastern Division on how to handle this very unexpected situation, and leaders from these higher levels of the church structure have not visited Cawthoolie. Indeed, the church leaders at these levels seem nervous about the situation. They want to dissociate the church from Cawthoolie and to keep missionaries and tourists away from there in order to prevent stories of Adventist-led armed struggle from surfacing (interviews).

Within the U.S. in the 1990s, "military recruiters come to Adventist school campuses, and school and university bulletin boards display posters advertising the benefits of service in the armed forces" ( Thomas, 1991). It is not surprising, then, that "most young Adventist adults are unaware of the strong pacifist thread in the fabric of Adventist history" ( Zork, 1991). In contrast with earlier generations, many young Adventists have enlisted, thereby agreeing to kill America's enemies if ordered to do so. The office of Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries estimated the total number of military personnel listing Seventh-day Adventist as their "religious preference" -- that is, of Adventist background -- as 6-8,000 in 1991, and that 2,000 of these participated in the Gulf War (interviews).

Adventist attitudes became much more openly jingoistic during the Gulf War:

Not only have (Adventist volunteer soldiers) been to the Persian Gulf and back; they have come home to welcoming applause in Sabbath worship services and patriotic accolades in the church's publications ( Scriven, 1991).

A non-Adventist church attendee wrote of being told by church members, "We should nuke them," that "according to the Bible 'there is a time for war,'" and

that "God instructed the slaughter of women, men and children" ( Banks- Bergmann , 1991). This mood was matched by the majority within the General Conference headquarters. An official there who was troubled by President Bush's decision to launch the war told of a sense of isolation from his colleagues because of widespread enthusiasm there for American participation, for "sending in the missiles and the bombs" (interview).

The Adventist message concerning military service has become blurred and confusing. Pamphlets available from Adventist Chaplaincy Ministries at the General Conference warn that "the Adventist Church strongly counsels its members NOT to enter military service voluntarily if they have conscientious beliefs that they either cannot bear arms or be available for routine military training or duty during Sabbath hours," but then they add that views on these questions are a matter of individual conscience (n.d.). Similarly, an article in a church periodical reviewed the biblical evidence:

"The attitude of the Christian should always be one of loyalty to his government," says Charles Martin, director of the National Service Organization of the Adventist Church. "But when the government conflicts with the requirements of God, he must obey God, at whatever cost.". . . "Whether defensive or offensive, just or unjust, war means killing," says Martin. "It's hard for some to believe that a soldier who shoots, stabs, shells, napalms, or bombs another human being is in harmony with One who said 'Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.'. . . Many Adventists and other Christians agree with Tertullian: Christ, in disarming Peter, ungirt every soldier."

But it then concluded:

The Adventist church recommends that its youth, if drafted, enter the armed forces as noncombatants. But the church also recognizes the right of individual conscience. An Adventist bearing arms is in no way a second class church member ( Goldstein, 1985 :3).

In contrast, any Adventist found to be smoking or drinking alcohol would be at least censured and possibly disfellowshipped. But Adventists do not claim that any of the Ten Commandments bear directly on either of these!

Advance publicity for a special Servicemen's Fund Offering in 1990, which quoted Calvin Rock, a Vice-president of the General Conference, put forward an unusually favorable view of the new generation of Adventist volunteer soldiers:

. . .serving God and Caesar at the same time. . . .we can give our dollars to support and supply Adventist military personnel stationed around the world. As representatives of Caesar, they guard our borders, scan our skies, search our oceans, protect our investments, staff our embassies, transport our leaders and aid our allies; in short, help secure the precious freedoms we so easily take for granted. As Adventists they preach, teach and live the gospel of Christ. . . Adventists at bases, forts and camps around the world. . .pledge to continue their noble and necessary service. . . ( "Servicemen's Fund Offering," 1990 :16). The evidence supports the conclusion that "on the question of military service, the anything-goes school, under the banner of 'individual conscience', has pretty much taken over in North America" ( Scriven, 1991). Indeed, this is the case in most of the Adventist world.

INTERPRETATION

This section brings the case study data to bear on the two issues raised at the outset. The first of these concerns the relations between a religious group and governments in a conflict situation and the process of accommodation between them. Three questions were posed:

i.

Which side accommodates? In this case, while both sides have accommodated on occasion, and sometimes reciprocally as when engaged in an exchange relationship, overall the Adventist Church compromised its position far more frequently and deeply. On many occasions it compromised not only its official stance on military service but also its commitment to Sabbath observance, which was considered so important a belief that it was included in the denominational name. Ultimately its accommodation on military service was so complete that it officially abandoned not only its original pacifist position but also its long-held noncombatant position, and instead endorsed individual conscience, wherever that might lead.

ii.

When does accommodation occur? A state is more likely to tolerate deviant views and practices by citizens when it is a liberal democracy committed to religious freedom, and when a religious group holding such views, such as the Quakers in the U.S. or the Jehovah's Witnesses in post-World War IIGermany, wins respect. Adventists, being latecomers and relatively small in number, and not having won respect as a result of surviving persecution as did the German Witnesses, have had to rely on more established groups preparing the way for them in such contexts. (One would expect that the state would be more willing to accommodate to the beliefs of Adventists where they make up a notably large group in the population or have representatives in high places. They have many representatives in parliament, and often in the cabinet, in Jamaica, Papua-New Guinea, and some other Pacific Islands, and the President of Palau and the Vicepresident of Uganda are both church members; their members also comprise increasingly large blocs among the population of such nations as Ghana, Kenya, and southern Mexico (interviews; General Conference, 1994). However, none of these states has enforced military conscription). States have also proved willing, even eager, to compromise, when both sides stand to gain via an exchange relationship. This was at the root of post-1939 cooperation in the U.S., when the armed forces needed well-trained medical personnel and later medical guinea pigs. Although Adventists have established exchange relationships with many authoritarian regimes in recent decades, none of these has resulted in major concessions on military service: in all cases, Adventists had accommodated completely in that respect before the relationship was consummated. For its part, the Adventist church proved willing to accommodate when it was eager to avoid conflict or to win approval, both of which became increasingly important as time passed, and when it accorded these goals priority over   its commitment to its beliefs. These goals were related, in turn, to upward mobility among hereditary members, increasing participation in society, and to leaders placing high value on acceptance and reputation ( Lawson, 1995 b). iii. Under what conditions does failure to come to terms occur? When beliefs are valued too highly to compromise, regardless of the resulting danger -- as in the case of the schismatic Reformed Adventists in Germany during both world wars and the True and Free Adventists in the Soviet Union from 1928 onwards; and when a stance based on a model developed and tested in a tolerant liberal democracy is transferred to a military dictatorship which refuses to budge -- as Adventists in South Korea found in the 1950s and 1960s. When, as in these situations, both sides fail to come to a meeting of minds, the outcome is persecution. Unlike the highly sectarian schismatic Adventists, the Adventist Church has proved eager to lower tension with state and society and has frequently given higher priority to these goals than to its commitment to its belief system. The second issue is the utility of the Stark and Bainbridge definition of sect and denomination in terms of a single variable, the degree of tension with its sociocultural environment and, in particular, of the group's stance on military service as a measure of this. The pacifist position originally adopted by Adventists has been transformed over time. In most countries where holding a deviant position would have resulted in overt church-state conflict, Adventists chose early to accommodate to the demands of the state. This involved not only bearing arms, but often also accommodation over Sabbath observance. In America, the noncombatant position, which replaced the pacifist stance in 1916 and held sway until 1972, became a vehicle for establishing close ties with both the military and the state. The decision in 1972 to regard the issue as one of individual conscience removed the embarrassment of having two conflicting approaches to military service within the world church and further reduced the likelihood of churchstate conflict over the issue. How successfully does this variable -- Adventism's changing stance on military service -- measure the movement of the group from sect towards denomination? While the dramatic shifts over time suggest considerable changes in Adventist-state tensions, the level of tension with governments over this issue has in fact rarely been very high, since even the original pacifist position made use of the accommodation between Quakers and the state, and Adventists were typically eager to avoid conflict with authorities thereafter. That is, as measured by this variable, Adventism was never strongly sectarian. However, when a more comprehensive measure is used, it shows that tension between Adventism and society was initially high. That is, military service proves to be an inferior measure of tension in this case. 8 However, the broadly-based tension between Adventism and society and its stance on military service are linked in important ways: 1. Changes in Adventism's tension with society account for its initial shifts on military conscription. 2. Its position on military service in the U.S. became the linchpin in the development of church-state relations within international Adventism. The analysis now explores each of these in turn. 1. It was noted above that Stark and Bainbridge include three elements in their definition of tension: difference, separation, and antagonism (1985:49-50). During its early decades, Adventism was markedly different from mainstream America. Its insistence on the strict observance of the Saturday Sabbath in a society where a six-day week was almost universal, its focus on the imminent return of Christ and the end of the world as we know it, diet restrictions (vegetarianism, no coffee, tea, or alcohol), social life-style prohibitions (no theater, dancing, gambling, card playing, smoking, or reading of fiction), a commitment to "dress reform" and abstinence from jewelry and makeup, as well as its refusal to bear arms if conscripted, set Adventists apart. Adventists were separated by their view of themselves as the biblical Remnant, the true church bearing God's final message in the last days; and also by the close ties that developed among them, for their lives usually centered around their church, the subculture it created and fostered, and its mission. They increasingly clustered together in communities such as Battle Creek, Michigan, which became known colloquially as "New Jerusalems" and later as "Adventist Ghettos", where their children could attend church schools and they could find Sabbath-free employment while furthering the mission of the church in its institutions. These barriers were reinforced by rules, such as endogamy, and practices, such as the dietary and social prohibitions, which made it difficult to associate with others. Meanwhile, Adventist declarations in their publications that other religious groups were "apostate" and "the whore of Babylon", and their brazen challenges to clergy of other denominations as a means of publicizing their evangelistic meetings, helped to create bitter antagonisms. These were strengthened by their rejection of the American Dream: not only did they hold that "the kingdoms of this world" were about to be swept away by the apocalypse, but their preaching, which focused closely on the apocalyptic visions of the biblical books of Daniel and Revelation, portrayed governments as wild beasts which hurt God's people. In the 1850s Adventists singled out the United States in particular, identifying it with the second beast of Revelation 13, which "had two horns like a lamb" and "spoke like a dragon." During its early decades it had been lamb-like, upholding the two principles of political and religious freedom, which they saw as symbolized by the two horns of the beast. But, pointing to slavery and to the religious intolerance shown by the churches' expulsion of their Millerite forebears and the states' jailing of Sabbath keepers who had violated blue laws by working on Sunday, they held that America was betraying both principles: it was already, and would increasingly become, a dragon in a lamb's clothing. That is, Adventist eschatology enshrined tension with the state, reflecting the problems its members faced adhering to the tenets of their faith in a hostile society ( Butler, 1974 :173-77). These views formed part of the context in which Adventism adopted its pacifist position during the American Civil War. However, Adventism began to change dramatically during the decades following the Civil War. Between 1870 and 1901, its evangelism became international, its membership increased steeply, and it built 16 colleges and high schools, a medical school, 75 "sanitariums" or hospitals, 13 publishing houses, and 31 miscellaneous institutions. It was putting down a stake in the societies where it operated (General Conference 1901; 1901-1902:596, 597). These changes were accompanied by a reshaping of Adventist eschatology. While America continued to be identified with the two-horned beast, it was no longer portrayed as already in the dragon phase, but as still lamb-like, and its demise was thus seen as less imminent. That is, the time believed to be remaining before the apocalypse was lengthening. Although the interpretation remained fundamentally pessimistic, since Adventists themselves had replaced slaves as the minority whose abuse would undo the Republic, Ellen White now counseled rapprochement with civil authorities in order to facilitate missionary work. Indeed, she urged Adventists to help prolong the future of America "so the Adventist message could go forth and flourish" ( Butler, 1974 :193-94). That is, Adventists found themselves in the curious situation of wishing to delay the apocalypse in order to have greater opportunity to preach that it was at hand. Although they continued to see politics as unsavory and a distraction from their primary purpose, Adventists now became involved in some issues which they regarded as vital, such as the campaign by the National Reform Association to extend the Sunday sacredness "blue laws" already in effect in some states to the national level. In spite of the fact that their rehoned eschatology saw the passage of a national Sunday law as the culmination of the prophecy concerning the two-horned beast, and thus a sure signal that the Second Coming of Christ was at hand, they felt obliged by Ellen White's counsel to "extend the time" to respond boldly to this threat. They established a magazine devoted to religious liberty, founded the National Religious Liberty Association, lobbied before congressional committees, presented legal briefs in court, and helped defeat Senator H.W. Blair's Sunday-Rest bill ( Butler 1974 :196-98). Adventists continued these activities into the twentieth century, when they became widely known as defenders of the First Amendment, which they saw as the basic guarantee of religious liberty in the U.S. ( Syme, 1973; Morgan, 1992; Hertzke, 1988). These changes -- the growing Adventist stake in society, especially in the U.S., through their institutions and their successful intervention in the political process there, and their ambivalence towards their own eschatological beliefs -represented a considerable reduction in tension with society. This set the scene for their shift in position on military service during World War I: the eagerness of American Adventists to express their patriotism through unarmed participation in the military rather than continuing their separating position of pacifism, and the willingness of German Adventists to take up arms to defend the Fatherland, even on the Sabbath, were not so surprising given the general tension-reducing trend already under way. 2. The situation of Adventism in America has continued to change, and at a markedly increasing pace, in recent decades, lessening its separation, antagonism and distance -- that is, its "state of tension" -- with society as a whole. The growth and accreditation of its educational and medical institutions has encouraged integration into the national economy and provided opportunities for upward mobility among members and their participation, as professionals, in society: Adventist medicine has become orthodox and many of its hospitals have prospered and won friends -- and they are now busily forming partnerships with other hospitals in order to be able to survive the changes challenging the American medical system; the coming of the five-day week has removed most of the major problems surrounding Sabbath observance; and Adventist dietary and smoking prohibitions have won increasing credibility as a result of medical research. At the same time, Adventism has lowered its antagonism toward others: it has allowed its expectations of persecution to diminish and has begun to build better relationships with other churches. As Adventists, through their institutions, gained a stake in society, their leaders identified increasingly with corporate executives and professionals: for example, they moved the church headquarters to a corporate park in Silver Spring, Maryland, during the 1980s, and at the 1994 Annual Council proposed that the President of the General Conference be recognized as the "chief executive officer" of the church ( Medley 1994 :6). This was accompanied by a growing desire for broad acceptance and recognition by the powerful. Consequently, in recent decades leaders have shown considerable concern for the image of their church, and have been at pains to separate it from "fanatics" who could make it seem cult-like, such as those with too radical an apocalyptic ideology.9 At the same time they have proved increasingly eager to gain government approval. In the U S. the transformation of the church's position on military service has been at the center of this phenomenon, as a position which could have been a major source of stigma and of tension with the state was converted into one of close cooperation. The exchange relationship which Adventists built with the US. military and state after 1939 through their noncombatant Military Cadet Corps, which was epitomized by the launching of "Operation Whitecoat" in 1955, was extended to other areas beginning in the 1950s. From the 1950s to the 1970s the General Conference made incremental decisions to permit the acceptance of government financial aid for Adventist hospitals and educational institutions--which heretofore would have been regarded as a dangerous entanglement with the state ( Morgan, 1992 , chapter 5; Syme, 1973 :120-143). The same process was repeated in Australia and the British colonies of Africa. A new opportunity for cooperation emerged in the early 1980s, when the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) became a channel for distributing vast sums from government sources such as USAID. For church leaders, ADRA was an "entering wedge" in regions where there was little Adventist presence and conventional missionaries were often unwelcome -- a role their hospitals had played in earlier years. However, the source and restrictions placed on the use of most of its funds in many ways transformed ADRA into an arm of American foreign policy: for example, it distributed a great deal of aid to projects in Honduras during the Contra War but nothing in Nicaragua (interviews). The relationship arrived at in the U.S. became the model in many parts of the international church. During the last two decades Adventist leaders in many countries, who were by this time typically citizens of those countries, increasingly sought to facilitate their endeavors by building exchange relationships with their governments. They were especially successful with authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe and the Developing World, where the fact that they had avoided a deviant position on military service was usually an important prerequisite. Adventists sought liberties (freedom to evangelize, to observe the Sabbath, protection of their institutions) and favors (for example, accreditation of schools, facilitation of projects through duty-free import of equipment) and, in return, were willing to help legitimate or otherwise assist regimes. Such relationships were especially numerous among the military regimes of Latin America, from Guatemala to Chile, in parts of Asia, such as South Korea and the Philippines, and Africa, especially Kenya. Adventists were also successful in establishing exchange relationships with several of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Romania (interviews). The original decisions in these countries to compromise by training and serving with weapons and, later, to pursue close relations with governments, seem to have been largely a matter of local initiative. However, church leaders took increasing pleasure in such relationships and the legitimacy and status they afforded to the Adventist Church, and intervened directly to further them. For example, Neal C. Wilson, President of the General Conference 1979-1990, saw himself as something of a traveling diplomat and basked in photo opportunities with heads of state; Robert S. Folkenberg, his successor, told proudly that when he was located in Guatemala City as the leader of the church in Central America he knew General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, the President of Guatemala, so well that he would visit him in the presidential palace and that he was the first Protestant leader to be given a state farewell reception when he was about to move to a new position (interview). During his term as world president, Wilson took the lead in cementing exchange relationships with the state in both the USSR and Hungary, where schismatic Adventist groups were bitterly opposed to such ties. At a time when Soviet leaders were anxious to silence the anti-government propaganda of the True and Free Adventists, he issued an open letter to all Soviet Adventists: The General Conference can recognize only one Seventh-day Adventist organization in any country. This would normally be the one recognized by the authorities . . . . we encourage all who consider themselves to be Seventh-day Adventists to identify with the recognized body of believers ( Wilson and Lohne, 1979).10 During a subsequent visit to the Soviet Union, Wilson established a close relationship with Konstantin Kharchev, the chair of the USSR Council on Religious Affairs, who later visited church headquarters and major educational, medical, and publishing institutions in the U.S. These contacts resulted in approval for the creation of an Adventist seminary outside Moscow. As the relationship deepened, Adventists praised Soviet religious liberty in their respected "Liberty" magazine and awarded Kharchev, at their Third World Congress on Religious Liberty in 1989, a citation honoring him as "Spokesman for Human Rights, Promoter of Religious Freedom" -- at a time when Gorbachev was seeking eagerly to liberalize the Soviet image (Editorial, 1988:44; Hegstad, 1987 :2-6; Wilson, 1987 :8; Nixon, 1989 :7). They subsequently received permission to establish a publishing house, a medical clinic, and church headquarters. When he was asked about his dream for the church, Wilson replied that it should "grow numerically and financially, and in terms of world acceptance and influence" ( Coffin, 1986 :9). In sum, then, this case study suggests that the concept of tension with society put forward by Stark and Bainbridge provides researchers with an excellent measure of the degree of sectarianism of a religious group and of its shifts in position along the sect-denomination continuum.11 However, while the level of tension surrounding a deviant stance on military service is often a good indicator of sectarianism, it is not as accurate as a more comprehensive measure that encompasses all the main components of tension. This is because tension with the state may be lowered by extraneous factors, such as the commitment of the state to religious liberty and accommodations it has already made with other groups holding a deviant position on military service. NOTES * The author wishes to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for fellowships which allowed him to collect data, and the Louisville Institute for a fellowship which permitted him to write this paper. 1. Since the U.S. had no established church, but a number of "mainline denominations," the latter became the preferred term among researchers here, especially those exploring the dynamics of change from "sect" towards "denomination."     2. Yinger distinguished a "church" from a "universal church", and thus used it as the equivalent of what others would identify as a "denomination."     3. On the other hand, social science departments at Adventist colleges are typically weak, so that there has been little sociological research.     4. Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2:13-17.     5. In 1989 the Adventist Church in Germany issued a public apology for its toadying to the Nazis (interviews).     6. The major exception to this pattern in Western Europe is France, where the majority choose to train with weapons rather than face the longer alternative service. However, most of them still try to arrange release from work on the Sabbath.     7. The issue of training with weapons has not been raised in many countries where conscription is not a present practice or a recent memory. These countries include India, Bangladesh, Japan, and Hong Kong, and also much of Africa (interviews).     8. It would have been a much more accurate measure of sect-state tension in the case of both the schismatic Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses ( Lawson, 1995 b).     9. A recent example of this was the hiring of a public relations firm to divert the media from identifying the Adventist Church with David Koresh's Seventh-day Adventist Branch Davidians ( Lawson, 1995 a).     10. Wilson took a similar position during the 1980s concerning a schism in Hungary triggered by ties between the church and the Communist regime, when he declared again that the General Conference would recognize only groups that themselves had government recognition ("Small Committee" Correspondence; Reiners, n.d.; interviews).     11. 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