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| The Middle East conflict: the Palestinian dimension |
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The Middle East conflict: the Palestinian dimension by James O. C. Jonah
A significant flaw in the search for peace in the Middle East over the years has been the calculated avoidance of the centrality of the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Only now are efforts being made to tackle the problem. But the recognition of the intractable nature of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship still offers the temptation to pursue other avenues of resolving the conflict. This kind of diplomatic approach to the conflict is both dangerous and futile. There can be no durable peace and stability in the Middle East until a just solution to the Palestinian plight is found. Those involved in Middle East diplomacy should be constantly reminded that, from the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 and the British Mandate under the League of Nations in July 1922 to the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the basis of the conflict between Jews and Arabs has been over sovereign territorial control of Palestine, and nothing else. The formulation of the Balfour Declaration was widely condemned by all Arabs and was perceived by one writer as "the double undertaking of irreconcilable commitments to the Jews and Arabs." (1) A writer who has given much thought to the issue of self-determination and nationalism had this to say of the problem: "The conception of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine could not possibly be squared with the principle of self-determination, or, for that matter, of democracy, on the basis of any of the generally accepted criteria." (2) Under the British Mandate, the conflict was mainly between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish Agency, which represented Palestinian Jews. In accordance with Article 4 of the mandate, the Jewish Agency, whose president was Chaim Weizman, was set up to cooperate with the British in implementing the promise of a Jewish national homeland. Despite the many Arab revolts and the guerrilla warfare conducted by the Jewish underground against the British, negotiations continued involving the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Committee, under the leadership of Mufti Haj Amin el Husseini. The Palestinian Arabs, strongly supported by all the Arab states, rejected the partition plan recommended by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in Resolution 181 of November 1947. The British government, which held the mandate under the League of Nations, increasingly took an ambivalent attitude toward the partition plan and in the end was one of the member states that abstained in the resolution. As David Ben-Gurion was broadcasting the declaration of independence under the terms of the UN partition resolution on May 1948, war broke out, with Egyptian bombs landing on Tel Aviv. (3) And, with the defeat of the Arab states, the Palestinian Arabs lost control of their own destiny. It should be recalled that during the League period and during World War II, Palestinian Arabs, with strong support from other Arab states, had actually been more successful in shaping the prospects for their future independence. For example, they had managed to pressure the British and other allied governments to reformulate the promise of a Jewish national homeland under the Balfour Declaration. The Churchill White Paper of 1921 appeared to reject the concept of a Jewish state in Palestine and also called for the restriction of Jewish immigration into Palestine. (4) However, between the end of the war in 1948, the subsequent signing of the armistice agreements in 1949, and the outbreak of the Six Day War in June 1967, the Middle East crisis was widely perceived as a conflict between Israel and the Arab states. The Palestinian Arabs, in contrast, were treated as a problem of refugees, for which UN Resolution 194 of December 1948 had made provisions for the right of return or compensation. What brought about this dramatic change of fortune for the Palestinian Arabs when they were marginalized in Middle East diplomacy? The initial setback for the Palestinians lay in the conflict of interests between the Palestinian people and King Abdullah of the "Emirate of Transjordan," who had been installed by the British in 1921 to protect their interests in the region. While the UN approved the installation of King Abdullah, it was bitterly denounced by both the Zionists and Arabs. (5) King Abdullah had his own ambitions. His two brothers, sons of Hussein Ali of Mecca, had been given substantial possessions under British arrangements. The elder brother, Ali, was the heir apparent of the Hejaz, and his younger brother, Faisal, was candidate for the kingship of Iraq. He wanted to expand his small domain of Transjordan, exploiting the concerns of British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin about the viability of the remainder of the partition arrangement after the war of 1948. Bevin sympathized with the king's des ire to lay claim to the West Bank. With conservative Palestinian supporters, Abdullah arranged a December 1948 conference, known as either the Palestine or Jericho Congress. The outcome of this conference was that it empowered Abdullah to represent the interests of Palestinians until they reestablished territorial control over Palestine. With the aim of finding a solution for the Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank, London and, to a lesser extent, Washington acquiesced to Abdullah's formal annexation of "the rump of Arab Palestine" to Jordan in April 1950. (6) With the annexation, the "Emirate of Transjordan" became the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan." The annexation could answer the frequently asked questions by Israeli officials as to the reasons why the Arab states never attempted to set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza between 1949 and 1967 before Israel occupied the area. With respect to the Gaza Strip, there was a clear understanding that it would be returned to Palestinians by Egypt when there was a comprehensive solution. The same was not true for the West Bank. Despite Palestinian and Arab governments' opposition to the annexation by Jordan, the rest of the community of states accepted this fait accompli. It seemingly offered a convenient solution to the Palestinian and refugee problem. While ignoring the ambitions of Jo rdan as well as the obvious political conflict between Palestinians and the Hashemites, many states applauded the decision of Jordan to grant full citizenship to Palestinians. Other Arab states were called upon to emulate Jordan with a view to resolving the refugee problem once and for all. They did not comply. The illusion of resolving the Palestinian Arab problem by this legerdemain has proven dangerous and costly. A new generation of Palestinians, residing mostly outside the West Bank and supported by radical Arab states, were beginning to question the lack of concern for their own self-determination. This gave rise to the full expression of Palestinian nationalism, particularly when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in Cairo in 1964. Often viewed with suspicion and concern, Arab governments nonetheless were obliged to give military and diplomatic support to the Palestinians because the Arab peoples as a whole, despite periodic conflicts of interests and because of their history of colonization, continued to strongly identify with the Palestinian cause. The decision and determination of the Palestinians to take up the cudgel on their own behalf did not always serve their own interests. By his vitriolic statements, the first chairman of the PLO, Ahmad al-Shugayri, brought diplomatic disaster to the Palestinians between 1964 and 1968. His successor, Chairman Yasir Arafat, has until lately fared somewhat better. But the die was cast. The defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War, and the occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), intensified the conflict between the Hashemites and the Palestinians. From the latter's perspective, even under King Hussein, Jordan was not only guilty of suppressing Palestinian nationalism, but the Kingdom was seen as too soft toward Israel and inclined to conduct secret negotiations with it. The conflict between the Hashemites and the Palestinians, after all, served Israeli interests. Despite a growing sense of Palestinian nationalism, politicians and pundits largely sidestepped Palestine except for refugees. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, nothing was said explicitly about Palestinian self-determination. Even the Gunnar Jarring mission of 1967-1971, which was mandated to promote agreement between the parties, examined the Palestine problem as a refugee issue and looked for a solution within Jordan. Black September was the outcome when Jordanian forces defeated and expelled the Palestinian armed elements in September 1970. Operating in Lebanon and Syria, the PLO sought revenge against Jordan. They accomplished this at the Arab League Summit in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974. There, Hussein sought support for his claim that he should negotiate with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. The PLO was opposed to the two-step approach by which Jordan would reunite the East and West Banks of the Jordan after which the Palestinians would negotiate with Hussein about Palestinian self-determination. The decision of the summit was to set aside Jordan's claim and grant the PLO the exclusive right to represent the Palestinian people, marking the beginning of the PLO's international diplomatic status. (7) Israel, Jordan, and the United States did not welcome the change, primarily because they very well understood the implications: the recognition of the PLO was likely to change the future of state relations in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Israel has always been ambivalent in its dealings with the Palestinians. While Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency agreed to the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state under the UN's partition plan, the Irgun Zvai Leumi--the precursor to the future Likud (Unity) party, which assumed power in Israel in May 1977 after twenty-six years in opposition--was strongly opposed. Not only did the Palestinians and Arab states reject partition, the Likud did as well. (8) The approach of the Labor Party was subtler: the problem of the Palestinians had been settled by the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and therefore there was no further need for another Palestinian state. (9) They were willing to consider the return of parts of the West Bank to Jordan in the context of security arrangements. However, as pressure mounted for the recognition of Palestinian self-determination--particularly at the UN--Prime Minister Golda Meir was reported as asserting that there were no Palestinians. (10) Israel reacted strongly against a statement by Harold H. Saunders, an assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, before the Middle East Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs in November 1975. For the first time, he talked about the Palestinian dimension: "We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israel peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict." (11) After Camp David in 1978, Israel itself began to recognize the necessity to tackle the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East conflict. Washington helped to shape Israel's view. President Jimmy Carter had stunned the Israeli government when he made his important "Palestinian" declaration in March 1977 at Clinton, Massachusetts. Israel received greater gratification when President Ronald Reagan, in a speech in September 1982, spoke against a Palestinian state and in favor of the Jordanian option. (12) Shortly afterwards, the Jordanian government endeavored to revive its option in the West Bank. However, that effort did not bear fruit, owing to the opposition of the PLO that refused to have Jordan negotiate with Israel on its behalf. Israel also attempted to close the door to Palestinian direct involvement in the negotiating process when it first opposed the participation of the PLO at the Geneva peace conference and engineered the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in 1982. The Madrid peace conference in October 1991 represented a major gain for the PLO and the Palestinian cause. Although the PLO participated as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, provisions were made for direct negotiations with Israel based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The Oslo Accords were signed in Washington in September 1993 and recognized the resolution of the Palestinian quest for self-determination as a major factor in the search for peace. Israel and the Palestinians recognized their "mutual legitimate and political rights" and both sides agreed to establish the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years. However, even as late as 1999, when Ehud Barak became prime minister, there still was a temptation to replace the Palestinian problem as the central issue by diverting the negotiating process to an agreement between Israel and Syria. By the spring of 2000 at Camp David II, the creation of a Palestinian state finally became a serious proposition. (13) Camp David II broke down over the future status of Jerusalem even though Prime Minister Barak made generous concessions in comparison with those of previous governments. However, who should be blamed for the failure of the negotiations? President Bill Clinton was unequivocal: Yasir Arafat missed a historical opportunity, a view shared by Barak. (14) There were others who disagreed that Arafat alone should take the responsibility for failure. (15) The best a neutral observer could say is that from all available evidence the parties came very close to a historic agreement. Hopefully, the complete protocol of the talks will provide a good foundation for an eventual agreement. But much more should be done before we reach that stage. The George Tenet understandings of June 2001 and the missions by retired general Anthony Zinni and Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001 and 2002 may advance the process. Suddenly, a commonsensical road map appeared for meaningful steps toward a comprehensive solution. In addition to a full acceptance of the state of Israel within recognized and secure borders, a withdrawal of settlements, and normal relations between all states in the region, what had been elusive for so long is now central: a viable Palestinian state, in the economic and political sense. The irony is remarkable. The final status of Jerusalem might well be the Gordian knot. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians by themselves can resolve that issue. Similarly, cooperation by other states will be required to resolve the refugee problem. While Israel has done a good job in integrating Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, the Palestinians should not be held accountable for the errors of Arab governments. In the light of present realities, greater emphasis undoubtedly should be given to compensation rather than the right to return. Repatriating over 1 million Palestinians to Israel would involve too great a security threat for Israel. We need not be overly pessimistic because of the intractable issues in play. (16) Since 1945, we have witnessed the resolution of conflicts and disputes that were once considered unsolvable. In tackling these issues, the leadership of the United States is vital, but Washington cannot succeed if it acts unilaterally. As at several previous junctures, multilateral institutions, and more especially the UN, will be essential. Notes James O. C. Jonah is a senior fellow at the CUNY Graduate Center's Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. He was formerly minister of planning and finance in Sierra Leone and UN under-secretary-general, whose many responsibilities included over fifteen years of Middle East involvement. (1.) Allen Bullock, Ernest Bevin (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 44. (2.) Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 313. (3.) Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy, And the Hills Shouted for Joy: The Day Israel Was Born (New York: David McKay, 1973), p. 230. (4.) Howard M. Sacher, The Emergence of the Middle East 1914-1924 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 383. (5.) Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 508. (6.) Ibid. (7.) Ann Mosley Lesch, Political Perceptions of the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980), pp. 58-60. (8.) Menachem Begin, The Revolt: The Dramatic Inside Story of the Irgun (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1948), p. 335. (9.) Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 17-19 April 1980, pp. 106-129. (10.) Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, 3d ed. (New York: Time Books, 1980), p. 138. (11.) Harold H. Saunders, The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), p. 9. (12.) Ibid., p. 60. See also Kurt Waldheim, "Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization," UN Doc. A/34/1, 31 August 1976. (13.) Shibley Telhami, "Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences," Current History 100 (January 2001). (14.) Ehud Barak, "Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace," New York Times, 31 July 2001. (15.) Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors," New York Review of Books (9 August 2001); Deborah Sontag, "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," New York Times, 27 July 2001; Alan Sipress, "Adviser: Clinton Exasperated with Barak During Peace Talks," Washington Post, 19 July 2001, p. 20; Lee Hockstader, "A Different Take on Camp David Collapse," Washington Post, 25 July 2001, p. 17. (16.) Benny Morris, "Peace? No Chance," The Guardian, 21 February 2002. |
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