Research paper on Competition Law

In actuality, cartel enforcement legislation of the EU is based on leniency programs which offer immunity for the first cartelist coming forward with details of a cartel. In this regard, it is possible to refer to the case of Whitacre, who came first and informed of the cartel and its operations. In addition, the EU competition legislation admits that wistleblowing cartelists may be eligible for reduced penalties in return for further admissions of potentially unlawful activities (Crouch, 2012). In such a context, Whitacre cooperation with law enforcement agencies matches the concept of leniency of wistle-blowers. However, leniency programs raise the problem of false allegations as was the case of Pfeiderer, which was accused of creating a cartel on the ground of lenient wsitleblowing. However, the investigation of the case did not reveal fact that prove the involvement of Pfeiderer in any cartel activities, while in response to the demand of Pfeiderer to uncover leniency documents was declined (Crouch, 2012). This decision of non-disclosure of leniency documentation was backed up by the European Commission. In fact, this decision means that the European Commission supports leniency of wistle-blowers, who become the major source of information of unlawful activities for European law enforcement agencies.

In fact, the directors of the AMD attempted to create a cartel. Therefore, their actions are liable to the Article 101 of TFEU regulations concerning cartels, using of fixed-price and other issues which are legally banned in the EU under the provision of this article. In actuality, the EU prevents the creation of cartels, while the AMD conducts policies that violate legal norms and standards defined in terms of the Article of 101 of TFEU, which prevent the creation of cartels and policies that lead to the creation of cartels. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the fact that the development of the EU competition law would interpret actions of the directors of the AMD as illegal. Therefore, the directors of the AMD violated the Article 101 of TFEU in regard to the regulations of cartel creation and related policies. In such a way, the company conducted illegal policies and they would be prosecuted in the EU.

In addition, the directors of AMD violated the EU competition law since they set fixed prices to take an advantageous position in the market that also contradicts to the Article 101 of TFEU. Fixed prices affected consistently the development of the market and violated the EU competition law. Therefore, the directors violated existing legal norms, which prevent the violation of the fair competition principles. In fact, the company could affect consistently consumers because of fixed prices. However, such policy is unfair in relation to rivals of the company, who did not come to agreement with the AMD. In this regard, the EU competition law prevents such policies because prices should be formed under the impact of the market development. The EU attempts to prevent the development of fixed prices and other unfair practices that violate principles of the fair competition.

Thus, taking into account all above mentioned, it is important to place emphasis on the fact that the development of the EU competition law leads to the prevention of the risk of the violation of principles of fair competition. In this regard, it is important to single out four major areas of the particular concern of the EU. First, the EU competition law prevents the creation of cartels and policies that lead to the creation of cartels. In this regard, the case of the AMD is a typical case of a cartel since the company coordinated its policies with other major players in the industry. In addition, the EU competition law prevents the creation of monopolies in the EU because they violate principles of the fair competition. Monopolies are extremely dangerous for the competitiveness of the EU in the global market. In addition, the EU competition law focuses on the regulation of mergers in the EU because they also affect the competition in the EU and create the threat of the creation of monopolies. Finally, the EU competition law controls the state aid to minimize the risk of the violation of balance in the market through the state aid.